( 37 ) THAT the converse use of definitions in the General Clause Act, in the manner made above, is permissible will be shown by the following two decisions. In Union of India v. A. L. Ralia Ram (25) the correspondence constituting the contract was in the name of the Government of India and was not expressed to be in the name of the Governor-General as required by Section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Never the less, the Supreme Court held that the requirements of Section 175 (3) were substantially complied with and observed as follows:

"the correspondence between the parties ultimately resulting in the acceptance note, in our judgment, amounts to a contract expressed to be made by the Government and therefore by the Governor-General, because it was the Governor-General, who had invited the tender through the Director of Purchases, and it was the Governor-General who through the Chief Director of Purchases accepted the tender of the respondent subject to the conditions prescribed therein. "

( 38 ) THE equation of the Government with the Governor-General was obviously based on the definition of the "central Government" in section 3 (8) (a) of the General Clauses Act which stated that the Central Government in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution meant the Governor General. Similarly in Ram Chancier Singh v. The State of Punjab (26) the order was expressed to be in the name of the Governor as required by Article 166 (2) of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the order was held to have substantially complied with the provisions of Article 166 (2) apparently because the State Government is defined in Section 3 (60) of the General Clauses Act to mean the Governor.

( 39 ) WE, therefore, hold that the Act of 1946 continued to be valid inspite of the adaptation made therein by the adaptation of Laws Order (No. 3) of 1956.

( 40 ) POINT NO. (4):the scheme of the Act of 1946 is that it would apply to only such offences as would be notified under Section 3 of the Act by the Central Government. Without such a notification, the Act would not have any real application at all. It is urged for the petitioner that the authority given to the Central Government is unfettered and unchannelised. It is pointed out that the original preamble of the Act of 1946 contained the words "for the investigation of certain offences committed in connection with matters concerning Departments of the Central Government. " But, these words were omitted by the Amendment of 1952. Thereafter, there was no indication by the legislature as to what offences wre to be notified by the Central Government under Section 3. The effect is that the Central Government can notify all possible offences thereunder and thus enjoy an arbitrary and unfettered power. This delegation contends the petitioner is excessive and, therefore, unconstitutional.

( 41 ) IN reply the learned counsel for the respondents pointed out firstly that Section 3 is an instance of conditional legislationas , distinguished from delegated legislation and that secondly even if it is delegated legislation it is not excessive. In appreciating the precise nature of Section 3, it is to be remembered that the Act of 1946 creates a Special Police Force in addition to the ordinary police force which already existed. The ordinary police force had several functions to discharge under the Police Act of 1861. Out of these several functions, only one function viz. , investigation of offences is conferred on this Special Police Force. Even this function is not to extend to all the offence which the ordinary police force is to investigate but only to those offences which are notified by the Central Government under Section 3. It will be seen, therefore, that even in the Union Territories the investigation by the Special Police is limited only to the notified offences and that the Special Police is not concerned with any other functions of the ordinary police. As far as the States a

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