The bona fide requirement of a landlord for premises for occupation as a residence for dependents of his family under section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is a question of fact in each case, and the landlord's bona fides is the crucial test.

( 1 ) THIS appeal under s. 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 questions the correctness of the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 1st December, 1967 dismissing the appeal of the present appellants from the order of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, dated 17th September, 1967, ordering eviction of the tenants in favour of Smt. S. L. Keshwani on the ground that the premises were bona fide required for the residence of the owner landlady and her family members dependent upon her.

( 2 ) THE eviction proceedings were initiated on two grounds, but the other ground of subletting was not sustained.

( 3 ) ON appeal, it was conceded on behalf of the tenants that the premises had been let out to them for residential purposes and also that the landlady was the owner thereof, with the result that the only question for determination was whether the landlady required the premises in dispute for her own residence and the residence of the members of her family dependent on her. After considering all the circumstances of the case and the arguments addressed, the Tribunal, in a very well-reasoned order, came to the conclusion that the order of the Additional Rent Controller was correct in all respects and there was nothing to show that eviction was sought for any mala fide purpose.

( 4 ) ON second appeal, Shri Yogeshwar Dayal has very strongly contended that no notice having been given to the tenant terminating the tenancy, the present proceedings for eviction were incompetent. According to him, in the written statement contesting their eviction the tenants had raised a plea of want of notice. In my opinion, this argument is not open to the appellants on second appeal because it was not raised and adjudicated upon before the Rent Control Tribunal. The plea of want of notice, as is well-settled by now, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and to permit it to be raised on second appeal in the High Court cannot but ordinarily be unjust and prejudicial to the opposite party. Reference at the bar has been made to a Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sawarj Pal v. Janak Raj, wherein it has been observed that in the case of a. monthly tenancy in the Punjab, in the absence of a specific contract and in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, a monthly tenant is entitled to at least 15 day s notice of eviction before any action for his ejectment can be brought in a competent Court or a Tribunal. Only the principle of justice, equity and good conscience contained in the first part of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the Punjab and the technical rule of procedure contained in the second part of that section making it necessary for the 15 day s notice to terminate with the end of the month of tenancy, cannot be invoked on principles of equity and good conscience. I do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the point whether or not in Delhi it is necessary to give notice under section 106, Transfer of Property Act, on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience, as observed in the reported decision. Suf- fice it to say that the plea of want of notice is not open to the appellants at this late stage of the present proceedings.

( 5 ) SHRI Yogeshwar Dayal has then contended that no finding has been given by the Tribunal on the extent of accommodation already available to the landlady. He has made a passing reference to a Single Bench dscision of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in Surjan Singh v. Bawa Kartar Singh", but that decision nowhere lays down that it is imperative cases, for the Fribunal to actually go into the question of accommodation available with the owner-landlord and come to its own decision whether or not that is sufficient for his needs and requirements. There, the learned Single Judge was concerned with the question of the landlord having no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and this questi