The High Court has limited power to interfere in revision with an order of the lower Appellate Court reversing an order of temporary injunction made by the original Court. The test for interference is a very much narrower one: that of jurisdictional or similar infirmity envisaged by Section 115, Civil Procedure Code.

( 1 ) SIX persons instituted a suit in the Court of Shri S. C. Ahuja, Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Delhi for a declaration and permanent injunction. An application for temporary injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, was also filed praying that the defendants be restrained from interfering in the work of S. Bhan Singh, plaintiff No. 1, as Secretary of defendant No. 1, the Prince Bus Service, during the pendency of the suit. It was alleged that S. Kanwaljit Singhdefendant was interfering with the work of plaintiff No. 1 as Secretary of the Association. This prayer was contested and the learned Subordinate Judge trying the suit considered it proper to restrain defendant No. 1 from interfering with plaintiff No. 1 in the discharge of his duties as Secretary of the Association in question. The defendant was also restrained from disturbing the possession of plaintiff No. 1 of the office located in room No. 5 where, according to him, be acted as Secretary.

( 2 ) THE matter was taken on appeal to the Court of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, who reversed the order of the trial Court and came to the conclusion that the balance of convenience was not in favour of the plaintiff. I consider it proper to reproduce the exact words of the lower Appellate Court:

"in any case I am of the considered view that the balance of convenience was also not in favour of the plaintiffs. There is no doubt that majority of the members were with the appellants. Under such circumstances the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to. issue from granting injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from withholding it. Plaintiff No. 1, in my view, would not suffer any irreparable injury if the temporary injunction was not granted. It is only a question of status for him. On the other hand, working of the Society is likely to be jeopardised. "earlier, the lower Appellate Court had taken into consideration a copy of a resolution dated 9-10-1966 which showed that plaintiff No. I had not been elected as an office-bearer and, therefore, was not entitled to any temporary injunction claimed. This factor also weighed with the lower Appellate Court. An objection was raised that this copy had not been produced in the Court of first instance and, therefore, could not be taken into consideration by the learned Senior Subordinate Judge on appeal. The Court below felt that the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, were not attracted in this case because the parties had not yet started leading evidence and there was, in the circumstances, no question of any permission to lead additional evidence. At the bar of the lower Appellate Court, it was stated that these documents had been filed earlier in some other suit instituted by the defendants and for this reason, they could not be produced in the trial Court in the present case. This explanation appealed to the lower Appellate Court and the documents in question were allowed to be produced and looked into.

( 3 ) BEFORE me on revision, Shri S. L. Bhatia, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, has very strongly argued that the lower Appellate ^ Court has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by allowing fresh documents to be placed on the record and to be taken into account. He has, in support of his submission, relied on Arian Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1951 SC 193, according to which, the discretion given to the Appellate Court by Order 41, Rule 27, to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in that rule. To allow additional evidence to be adduced contrary to the principles governing reception of such evidence is, according to this decision, a case of improper exercise of discretion and the evidence thus brought on the record deserves to be ignored. In regard to the question of balance of convenience, the l

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