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High Court Of Delhi
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI - Appellant
Versus
KULDIP LAL BHANDARI - Respondent
Decided On : 12/09/1968
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 110-D - APPEAL - JUDGMENT - LETTERS PATENT, CLAUSE 10 - INTERPRETATION - MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL - NATURE OF - DECISION OF - WHETHER A JUDGMENT - HIGH COURT - JURISDICTION - APPEAL TO - WHETHER COMPETENT.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant-Municipal Corporation of Delhi was held liable for injuries sustained by Mrs. Bhandari due to the negligence of its employees, the driver and conductor of a bus. The respondents, as her legal representatives, claimed compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, which dismissed the claim. A learned Single Judge of the High Court partially decreed the claim in an appeal preferred to the High Court under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appellant challenged this decision by way of an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Full Bench of the High Court held that the decision of the learned Single Judge in an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
Issues: 1. Whether the decision of the learned Single Judge in an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent? 2. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the decision of the Claims Tribunal under Section 110-D of the Act?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not a Court, but a Statutory Tribunal governed entirely by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 2. The decision of the Tribunal, except when it awards compensation of less than Rs. 2,000, is open to appeal to the High Court under Section 110-D of the Act. 3. The appeal to the High Court under Section 110-D enables the High Court to consider the claim in its entirety free from any limitations in the same way as the High Court would consider the claim in an appeal from a Civil Court from an area in which a Claims Tribunal has not been established. 4. The High Court, in dealing with an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act, acts as a High Court and not as a Tribunal or a persona designata. 5. The decision of the High Court in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
Final Decision: The preliminary objection challenging the maintainability of the appeal was rejected, and the appeal was allowed to proceed on merits before the Division Bench.
( 1 ) -DUE to ant to the D. T. U. bus No. DLP 658 belonging to the appellant-Municipal Corporation of Delhi, a lady named Mrs. B. Bhandari suffered injuries which resulted in her death. The respondents, as her legal representatives, claimed compensation from the appellant before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Delhi on the ground that the injuries caused to Mrs. Bhandari were due to the negligence of the appellant s employees, viz. the Driver and the Conductor of the bus. The claim was dismissed by the Tribunal but was partially decreed by a learned Single Judge of the then Circuit bench of the Punjab High Court for Delhi in an appeal preferred TO to the High Court against the award of the Tribunal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
( 2 ) THE present appeal was preferred TO before a Division Bench of this Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applicable to this High Court. It is common ground that such an appeal lies from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court. The respondents have, however, raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of this appeal on the ground that the decision of the learned single Judge against which this appeal purports to be made is not a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Divion Bench speaking through my lord the Chief Justice surveyed the relevant case law on the subject and REFERRED TO the matter to the Full Bench on the 15th May, 1968 in view of the apparent lack of agreement among the judicial decisions.
( 3 ) THE Central question for consideration by us is whether the judgment under appeal given by the learned single Judge in an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal under Section IIO-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) is:- (1) ajudgment, (2) given by a Judge of this Court within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent
( 4 ) IN view of the lack of agreement among the judicial decisions noticed in the referring order, it is necessary to go to the first principles under-lying the question. It is to be noted that the claim for compensation made by the relatives of the deceased is based on the alleged negligence of the employees of the appellant-Corporation. Its nature is simply a suit for negligence. Negligence is a well established ground for claim for damages in the law of torts. Such a claim has been a part of common law for many years and has been entertained by civil Courts in their ordinary action. Claim for damages for injuries caused by the persons in charge of the motor vehicle was also entertained by ordinary Civil Courts in India prior to the enactment of Motor Vehicles Amendment) Act, 100 of 1956, which for the first time empowered the State Governments to constitute one or more Motor Accidents. Claims Tribunals. Under Section 110 of the amended Motor Vehicles Act, the State Government may constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for such areas as may be specified. It is only in respect of those areas for which such Claims Tribunals are constituted, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is taken away by the Claims Tribunals. For. the rest of the areas, the Civil Courts will continue to entertain these claims. The significance of this fact for the nature of the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal is that the nature of the claim which is entertained by the Claims Tribunal is precisely the same which is entertained by a Civil Court. The Tribunal itself is not, however, a Civil Court, inasmuch as the very purpose of establishing it was to adjudicate all these claims more expeditiously than would be done by a Civil Court. This is why the procedure of making the claim before the Tribunal under Section 110-A and the enquiry made by the Tribunal under Section 110-B are of a summary nature as distinguished from the ordinary procedure of Civil Courts. Section 110-C gives certain specified powers of a Civil Court to the Tribunal sh
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