A court referred to in section 28 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, can consider the validity of the decree passed by it as a Tribunal in the sense of its being within or outside the inherent jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

( 1 ) WE are called upon to answer the following question which has been referred to us by a Bench consisting of Hegde. C. J. and Shankar, J :

"whether the court referred to in section 28 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, can consider the validity of the decree passed by it as a Tribunal ?"the Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court in first appea. from order of Shri M. L. Verma, Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, made in the course of execution of an order made by a Tribunal at Amritsar under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act ). In order to understand the precise controversy giving rise to the question referred, it may be pointed out that Shri K. C. Manchanda (appellant in this Court) made an application under. section 13 of the Act before the Tribunal constituted under the Act at Amritsar against M/s. Murree Brewery Company Rawalpindi (Pakistan) (hereafter described as the Company ). On 16-2-1955, an ex parte decree for Rs. 54,400 was passed by the said Tribunal. An application made by the Company under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, for setting aside the ex parte decree was dismissed. Thereafter the decree was transferred from Amritsar to the Delhi Courts for execution. In the course of these proceedings, the Company presented objections undersection 47 of the Code and the objection which concerns us at this stage relates to the plea that the decree made by the Tribunal at Amritsar being a nullity and the Tribunal having no inherent jurisdiction over the Company and the subject-matter of the proceedings, the executing Court at Delhi which is a civil Court, should decline to execute it. Both the executing Court and the learned Single Judge upheld the Objection. Before the learned Single Judge, ii was conceded on behalf of the appellant-decree-holder that if the Tribunal which passed the decree had no inherent jurisdiction to pass it, then the objection to the execution of such a decree can be taken before the executing Court and all that was urged on behalf of the appellant was that the Tribunal at Amritsar did not lack inherent jurisdiction since it was competent for that Tribunal to decide whether or not the amount claimed before it was a debt. The decision on this point arrived at by the Tribunal was contended to be final and conclusive. This contention was sought to be supported on the basis of the majority view of a Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Parkash Textile Mills Ltd. v. Messrs Mani Lal and others, AIR 1955 Punj. 197 (1 ). The learned Single Judge, however, distinguished the Full Bench decision and considering the ratio of two Supreme Court decisions in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 S. C. 340 (2) and Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 S. C. 199 (3), to be more directly applicable, dismissed the appeal upholding the order of the executing Court.

( 2 ) BEFORE us also, it is not dispute^ that a decree made by a Tribunal wanting in inherent jurisdiction to make the decree, would be a nullity and that the executing Court would, in such a case, be fully justified to decline to execute such a decree. The submission which has been strongly pressed before us is that the Tribunal has been given the power to decide whether or not aparticular transaction is a debt and whether or not a particular party is a debtor or a creditor as contemplated by the Act, with the result that any opinion expressed by the Tribunal on these questions would be final and conclusive, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the civil-Courts to reopen those conclusions. Support for this submission has primarily been sought from the majority view of the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Parkash Textile Mills Ltd. , and some other decisions. Before dealing with those decisions, we consider it proper to point out that though at the initial