A court has the discretion to extend the time for filing an appeal under section 5 of the Limitation Act if the appellant can show sufficient cause for the delay.

( 1 ) THIS execution second appeal is directed against the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, dismisring the appeal from the order of a learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class dated 17th May, 1963 as barred by time and also as improperly filed.

( 2 ) THE facts on which the conclusion of the court below is founded are that the order of the executing court was made on 17th May, 1963. Application for copy was made on 20th May, 1963 and the same was ready on 5th July, 1963. Its delivery was taken on 15th July, 1903. In the meantime, an appeal had been filed on 1st June, 1963 without a duly attested copy but with an unattested true copy. It is conceded before me that aftertaking into account the time spent inobtaining the certified copy, the limitation for the appeal was to expire on 23rd July, 1963, However, on 20th July. 1963, the appeal was taken up for hearing and dismissed in default of appearance by the appellant. An application was made for its restoration on the same day which was allowed on 20th August, 1963. It is asserted on behalf of the appellant and not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the certified copy of the order was produced in court on 20th August, 1963, the day the appeal was restored. At the Bar before me It has been stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that on the day when the appeal was dismissed in default and an application for restoration was made, on that very day an oral request_ wag also made to the learned Additional District Judge I for permitting the appellant to place on the record the certified copy of the order of the trial Court, but the learned Additional District Judge declined this request with the remark that the appeal having been dismissed in default, there was no point in placing this copy on the record. It may also be mentioned that the order of the trial court was apparently insufficiently stamped. I am told that the certified copy of the judgment bore court-fee of the value of Rs. 1. 25 paise whereas the court-fee required wai of the value of Rs. 265 paise. The court below has observed that an order determining the question failing within section 47 or section 144, Code of Civil Procedure, being ineluded in the definition of the term decree, the order of the executing court had the force of a decree and, therefore, it required court-fee stamp of the value of Rs. 2. 65 paise. On both these points, the decision was given against the appellant and the appeal dismissed.

( 3 ) ON second appeal, it has been argued that the learned Additional District Judge has gone wrong in law in holding the appeal both as barred by time and imoroperly filed and I am inclined to agree with the submission. It is conceded that the time for filing the appeal against the impugned order of the executing court was to expire on 23rd July, 1963 On 20th July, 1963, the appeal was dismissed in default. The certified copy could be produced on the record at: any lime upto 23rd July, 1963, or at least upto the hearing of the appeal on 27th July, 1963 without any risk of the appeal being held barred by time. The only default committed by the appellant was that he did not apply for placing the order on the record between 20th July, 1963 and 20th August, 1963. i am assuming that the statement from the Bar that on 20th July, 1963 an oral request was made to the Additional District Judge for taking on the record the certified copy is of no avail to the appellant. The question is: do these facts not constitute a sufficient cinse for extending the time within the meaning of section 5. Indian Limitation Act? In my opinion, it does, and nothing has been shown on behalf of the respondents that there are any mala fides or gross negligence or otherwise serious laches on the part of the appellant which would justify penalising the appellant or declining a hearing on the merits of this appeal. It I may be pointed out that under the law, a written application for claiming relief under section 5