The main legal point established in the judgment is that the competent authority must apply its mind before dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the absence of such an order would invalidate the proceedings.

( 1 ) IN terms of a notification dated 20th september, 1988 issued under Section 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act ) a parcel of land measuring 4 bighas and 14 biswas with super structures on the same situate in Khasra No. 332/2 min of Village Pul Pehlad, Tehsil Mehrauli was notified for acquisition by the Delhi administration. Since the notification dispensed with an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, a declaration under Section 6 was issued shortly thereafter on 7th October, 1988. The petitioner who owns three bighas and 12 biswas out of the aforementioned land has assailed the validity of the above notification as also the declaration issued in pursuance thereof.

( 2 ) THE petitioner s challenge is two-fold. In the first place, the petitioner contends that there was no urgency for acquisition of the land by invoking the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the Act. It is argued that the acquisition of a small extent of four bighas and four biswas could involve no possible urgency nor could any development work be held up on account of such a small piece of land. Alternatively, it is contended that although the notification issued by the respondents dispensed with the holding of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act,. the competent authority, namely, the Lt. Governor had neither applied his mind to the question of dispensing with the enquiry nor issued any direction to that effect. The notification to the extent it purported to dispense with an enquiry under Section 5-A was, therefore, unsupported by any order on the file which rendered the same illegal.

( 3 ) SECTION 17 of, the Act confers special powers upon the appropriate Government in cases of urgency. It, inter alia, provides that in cases of urgency whenever the Appropriate government so directs, the Collector may take possession of any land needed for a public purpose, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9 (1) of the Act, even though no award has been made by him. Such land would thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.

( 4 ) THE Government has, in the instant case, invoked special powers vested in it under section 17 (1) on being satisfied that the land in question is urgently required for a valid public purpose, namely, Planned Development of Delhi. Although the existence of the alleged urgency is itself under challenge in the present proceedings, it may not be necessary for this court to examine that aspect having regard to the fact that there is a more formidable challenge to the proceedings on the alternative arguments urged before us. The contention, precisely speaking, is that the mere existence of an urgency within the meaning of Section 17 (1) of the Act, does not ipso facto imply that an inquiry in terms of Section 5-A of the Act should be dispensed with. Since the owners have a valuable right to object to the proposed acquisition in an inquiry envisaged under Section 5-A, any order that purports to dispense with the conduct of such an inquiry can be lawfully made only after the competent authority has applied its mind to the need for dispensing with such an inquiry. There is, according to the petitioners, no order by the competent authority directing that inquiry under Section 5-A should be dispensed with, leave alone an order passed after due and proper application of mind, which, according to the petitioner, renders the impugned notification bad in law.

( 5 ) THE legal position as regards the need for making a proper order dispensing with an inquiry under Section 5-A is no longer res integra, having been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14. That was also a case where the question that fell for consideration was whether mere existence of an urgency or unforeseen emergency within the contemplation of Section 17 (1) would by itself be sufficient to result in the dispen