The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for expeditious disposal of cases under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the limited scope of exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C.

( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the summoning order dated 27. 7. 1999 under Section 138 of the negotiable Instruments Act passed by metropolitan Magistrate Delhi, and order dated 10. 2. 2005 also passed by Metropolitan magistrate, Delhi, declining to recall the summoning order.

( 2 ) I have heard Ms. C. M. Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Shobha, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Ms. Santosh Kohli, learned Additional public Prosecutor, on the point of admission, and have gone through the copies of the documents placed on the file.

( 3 ) AS per complaint under Section 138 read with section 141 and 142 of the Negotiable instruments Act, read with section 420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, the case of the complainant is that it is a Government company. Its object is to promote small scale industrial units in the country. In para 3 it is alleged that accused No. 1 is a company having its registered office at New Delhi. Accused Nos. 2 to 9 are persons who are controlling the business affairs of the accused no. l and are in-charge of and responsible to the accused No:l company for the conduct of the business thereof. They are playing active role in the management and in the day-to-day affairs of the accused No. 1.

( 4 ) THE accused No. l was granted financial assistance for procuring raw material. The accused No. l issued a cheque dated 10. 1. 1999 in the sum of Rs. 24,99,450/- as part payment of its pecuniary liability in favour of the complaint, the cheque was signed by accused No. 1 and 3 for and on behalf of accused No. l. The said cheque was dishonoured because the accused had closed the account meaning thereby that the accused knew that the cheque would be dishonoured. It is alleged in para 8 that the offence has been committed by accused No. 1 company through and with the consent and connivance of all the accused Nos. 2 to 9. Notice was sent but in vain.

( 5 ) I have also gone through the summoning order dated 27. 7. 1999 wherein the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, after hearing and perusing the record, was of the opinion that prima facie case was made out and accordingly summoned the accused persons. Accused No. 7, who is the petitioner before this Court, for the first time moved an application dated 5. 3. 2004, i. e. after more than four years, for recall of the summoning order. The application was dismissed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 10. 2. 2005.

( 6 ) THE prayer for recall of order was declined in view of the Supreme Court Ruling in the matter titled "adalat Prasad Vs. Roop Lal jindal and Ors. " 2004 VIII AD (S. C.) 533 = 2004 Vol. (7) SCALE (137), where it has been opined that the Magistrate cannot recall his own order and the only remedy available is to approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. There is no quarrel about the legal position that a petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. can be filed in the High Court but whether that petition can be allowed depends upon the facts and circumstances of the given case and the established law that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and in extraordinary situations. While dealing with the other limbs of the arguments, the question whether this petition can be allowed within the four corners of section 482 Cr. P. C. will be also dealt with.

( 7 ) NEXT the learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly contended that no particular role has been attributed to the petitioner in the complaint and no individual notice was sent to the petitioner by the complainant. There is no dispute that the petitioner was Director at the time when the financial assistance was taken from the complainant and the cheque in question was issued. This prima facie means that the petitioner must be attending the company meetings because the attendance in the meetings is compulsory under the company law and no loan can be raised or fin