The absence of a registered lease deed for a tenancy for manufacturing purposes precludes the application of the legal fiction in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the statutory requirement of Section 107 must be satisfied for the rule of construction to be applicable.

B. N. CHATURVEDI, J.

( 1 ) INSTANT appeal is directed against an order dated 16. 1. 2006 of the learned Additional District Judge dismissing the appellant s appeal against judgment and decree dated 28. 7. 2005 passed by the Court of Civil Judge in favour of respondent.

( 2 ) THE respondent is owner/landlord of an industrial shed admeasuring about 4,000 sq. ft. situated at 458-466, Indian Sulphacide Industries Compund, gali No. 8, Friends Colony, G. T. Road, Shahdara, Delhi, which was let out to the appellant in the year 1976 initially @ Rs. 2,200/- per month. According to the respondent, it was a tenancy from month to month commencing on the first day of every English Calender month and ending on the last day of the month. A notice to quit was served on the appellant terminating its tenancy and calling upon it to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the respondent. On appellant s failing to abide by the notice, the respondent filed a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits, which was, eventually, decreed in favour of respondent.

( 3 ) IN appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court, one of the points raised was that the tenancy had not been legally and validly terminated. It was argued that the tenancy being for manufacturing purposes could have been terminated only by serving a six months notice in terms of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ? the Act?) and not by 15 days notice.

( 4 ) THIS argument was, however, held unacceptable by the first appellate court.

( 5 ) THE lease was created by way of a written lease deed dated 16. 8. 1976, which is unregistered one.

( 6 ) THE only point of law sought to be raised herein by the learned counsel for the appellant is that once it is admitted that the lease was for manufacturing purposes, in terms of Section 106 of the Act, the same shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable by six months notice. This argument was advance and not accepted by the first appellate court in view of the fact that the lease deed executed between the parties was admittedly an unregistered document.

( 7 ) SECTION 107 of the Act requires that where a lease of immovable property is from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, the same can be made only by a registered instrument. In the instant case, since the lease deed under which the property was let out for manufacturing purposes was admittedly not got registered, no lease from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be held to have been created. The first appellate court relied upon a decision of the supreme Court in ?samir Mukherjee Vs. Davinder K. Bajaj and Others?, AIR 2001 sc 1696, to reach the conclusion that in the present case since the lease was not created under a registered instrument, no lease from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, could be held to have been created.

( 8 ) IN Samir Mukherjee s case (supra), the Supreme Court observed that in the absence of a registered instrument, no valid lease from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be created and if the lease is not a valid one within the meaning of opening words of Section 106, the rule of construction embodied therein would not be attracted. Samir mukherjee s was also a case where the lease for manufacturing purposes had not been created by means of a registered written lease and in the circumstances, it was held that rule of construction envisaged in Section 106 of the Act would not be applicable as the statutory requirement of Section 107 of the Act had not been satisfied. Accordingly, the plea against the validity of 15 days notice terminating the tenancy was held to be not sustainable.

( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has not referred to any case law to the contrary to support his argument that absence of a registered lease

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