BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision petition has been filed challenging the order on charge as well as the charge framed on 22. 4. 2006 by the learned Additional Sessions judge against the present petitioner.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially there were four accused in this case. The four accused were Mahesh Kumar (husband), late Banarasi Das (father-in-law), Smt Kusum (married sister-in-law)and Urmila Devi (the present petitioner) (mother-in-law ). He submitted that insofar as the other three accused are concerned, they faced trial and were acquitted by a judgment and order dated 24. 9. 2003. The present petitioner was absconding and her trial could not commence because of that. However, after the judgment and order of acquittal of the co-accused, the petitioner has joined the proceedings and she has been charged by virtue of the order on charge and formal charge for having committed offences, firstly under Section 498a and secondly under Section 304b/34 IPC.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no useful purpose would be served by subjecting the present petitioner to a full fledged trial because on the same set of facts and on the same evidence, the co-accused have been acquitted by the trial court by virtue of the said judgment and order dated 24. 9. 2003. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the role ascribed to the present petitioner was in common with the role ascribed to the other co-accused and there was no specific or separate role which was ascribed to the present petitioner by the prosecution as borne out by the statements as well as the evidence which has come on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the trial court, on the basis of the entire evidence led before it, concluded that it was doubtful as to whether the deceased (Meenu)was subjected to cruelty or harassment for the sake of dowry by any of the accused person. It concluded that the prosecution was not able to prove its case against any of the accused and that it would not be safe to act upon the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It is in these circumstances that the co-accused were acquitted on the benefit of doubt being given to them. He submits that it is the very same evidence which is going to be pressed into service against the present petitioner and, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by subjecting the petitioner to a full fledged trial.

( 4 ) HE also submitted that the charge against the petitioner is also under section 304-B/34 IPC. When all the co-accused have been acquitted, there is no question of invoking Section 34 IPC and, that being the case, since there is no specific allegation or role ascribed to the petitioner, there is no question of a conviction order being passed under Section 304b alone insofar as the present petitioner is concerned.

( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner took me through the judgment dated 24. 9. 2003 to show the manner in which the evidence led by the prosecution witnesses and, particularly, by the mother and sisters of the deceased (Meenu)have been discussed in detail by the trial court and have been found to be untrustworthy. He then referred to the decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of Sunil Kumar v State : 81 (1999) DLT 197 wherein, also, the to co-accused had been acquitted while the petitioner therein had been absconding and, therefore, the trial could not proceed against him. Subsequently, after the co-accused were acquitted, the petitioner, in that case, surrendered before the additional Sessions Judge and sought his discharge on the ground that the other accused had been acquitted of the offences under Sections 148/302/149 IPC. Rejecting that prayer, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had framed a charge under Section 304/34 IPC against the petitioner therein. However, this court set aside that order and concluded that the trial would only mean