BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J.

( 1 ) THESE two petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') are essentially for the same relief, i. e. , quashing of the FIR No. 62/2004 under Section 406/120-B ipc registered at police station Kapashera. The petitioners have sought quashing in one petition on the ground of compromise /settlement arrived at between the petitioners on the one hand and the complainant bank (ICICI Bank Ltd) on the other. Quashing of the FIR has also been sought on merits in the other petition. However, both the petitions are taken up together and, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

( 2 ) THERE is no dispute that the FIR referred to above came to be registered at the instance of the complainant bank on account of the alleged non-payment of the loans taken by the petitioners for 14 vehicles which stood hypothecated with the complainant bank. There is also no dispute that the petitioners and the complainant bank have settled the matter amongst themselves. An affidavit of one of the petitioners, namely, G. Udayan dravid dated 16. 11. 2006 has been filed in this court as per the draft provided by the complainant bank. It is also clear that the complainant bank has now no grievance left insofar as the present matter is concerned.

( 3 ) IT is in these circumstances that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that it was a fit case for quashing of the FIR and ail proceedings pursuant thereto. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant bank has not opposed this prayer in view of the settlement / compromise arrived at between the complainant bank and the petitioners.

( 4 ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has taken an objection to the quashing of the FIR, whether on compromise or on merits. According to the learned counsel for the State, the charge-sheet has been filed under Section 406/120-B IPC against the petitioners. It is his contention that since the said offence is not compoundabie in terms of Section 320 of the code, this court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, Crpc and quash the FIR. He further submitted that a clear case under Section 406 IPC was made out against the petitioners as borne out by the material collected and indicated in the charge-sheet. It is his contention that if the matter is allowed to proceed, he is certain that it would lead to conviction of the petitioners under Section 406/120-B IPC.

( 5 ) MR Malhotra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners placed reliance on several decisions of this court, both of single Judges and Division Benches as well as of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that where the parties have settled and compromised, even if the offences are not compoundabie, the High Court is not powerless in quashing the FIR and criminal proceedings in exercise of its powers under section 482, Crpc. He referred to the following decisions:-

i) Vicky Malhotra and Others Vs. State and Another: 134 (2006) DLT 4321; ii) D. C. Singham Vs. State and another: 133 (2006) DLT 2722; iii) Daulat Zia Vs. Govt. of NCT of delhi and Others: 1998 V AD (DELHI)627 = 74 (1998) DLT 259 (DB)3. iv) Mahesh Chand and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan 1990 (Supp) SCC 681; v) B. S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana 2003 III AD (S. C.)189 = 2003 (4) SCC 6754.

( 6 ) MR Malhotra also made a submission that although the charge-sheet has been filed under Section 406 IPC, the offence punishable under that Section is not made out. Section 406 IPC relates to the punishment provided for criminal breach of trust which is explained in Section 405 IPC. He submitted that before there can be criminal breach of trust, there must be entrustment. He further submitted that in a case of hypothecation, there is no question of entrustment and, therefore, there would be no question of criminal breach of trust.