J. M. MALIK, J.

( 1 ) THE parties have locked horns over the question whether the appellant/plaintiff has any cause of action against the respondent. The learned trial Court decided the case against the appellant and dismissed the plaint. The first Appellate Court affirmed the order of the learned Trial Court. The facts of the appellant's case emanating from the record are these. The respondent/defendant Krishan Kumar Gaur entered into an agreement to sell his house bearing No. 100-A/2, Gautam Nagar, New Delhi with one Gurbachan Singh on 14. 05. 1984. The key controversy swirls around Clause 6 of the said agreement which runs as follows :-

"in case the existing passage to the aforesaid plot sold to second party in which a house has been constructed by the second party is not permitted by the Delhi Administration/dda within a period of fifteen years from this day, the first party shall provide a 6 feet passage from his own plot for the entries to the house of the second party, in case, however, the existing passage is not closed the second party will not open any window/door in the front party's property. "

( 2 ) THE present appellant purchased the abovesaid house on payment of sale consideration of Rs. 2,30,000/- from the abovesaid Gurbachan Singh vide agreement to sell and purchase dated 03. 04. 1986. It is stated that the appellant has stepped into the shoes of Gurbachan Singh as per the abovesaid agreement. The passage in question was not permitted till the filing of the suit. The parties were required to wait till May, 1999 as per abovesaid Clause 6. However, in between, during the last week of August, 1986 the respondent started constructing a pucca wall leaving a space of 3 feet wide and 11 feet long in front of the window of the bed room and bath room of the appellant's house, and thereby, committed flagrant violation of the terms and conditions of the abovesaid Clause 6. It also transpired that the respondent is going to sell the aforesaid vacant plot to somebody without giving 6 feet passage to the appellant. The respondent also threatened to damage the water pipe line and sewer of the appellant which was situated at a distance of about 4 feet from the wall of the house of the appellant and situated in the vacant portion of the plot of the respondent. Under these circumstances, the present suit for mandatory injunction was filed against the respondent on 29. 09. 1986.

( 3 ) THE Trial Court came to the conclusion that due to abovesaid clause 6, the contract in question is contingent. The appellant conceded before the Court that the passage had not yet been closed by D. D. A nor there was any notice or any intention of the D. D. A. to close the passage by 1999. The learned court held that the suit filed by the appellant is pre-mature and the appellant did not have any right for grant of ad-interim injunction. Reliance was placed on a case decided by this Court in Jiwan Das v. Narain Das etc. , 1981 rajdhani Law Reporter 596, wherein it was held : -

"adverting, therefore, to the merits of the controversy, it may at the outset be taken note that unlike the law in England where an agreement of sale creates an equitable estate in the purchaser, the law in India does not recognise any such estate. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate. No privity in estate can be deduced therefrom which can bind estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. Till,