( 1 ) THE petitioner is a registered partnership firm and in pursuance to an invitation for tender floated by respondent no. 1 for work of construction of shopping centre at New Rajinder Nagar, a tender bid was submitted. The tender submitted by the petitioner was accepted in terms of the letter dated 30. 11. 1990 of respondent no. 1/dda at a tendered cost of Rs. 1,24,75,860/- and an agreement was executed between the parties dated 12. 12. 1990. The stipulated date of completion was 9. 3. 1992 (15 months ). The work was, however, completed only in late April, 1998 and the completion certificate was issued on 28. 4. 1998. The petitioner blames respondent no. 1/dda for the same.

( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that in view of the disputes about payment between the petitioner and respondent no. 1, the petitioner issued a notice dated 9. 7. 2001 to the Chief Engineer of respondent no. 1 for appointment of an arbitrator and in view of the failure to do so, filed a Suit No. AA No. 258/2002 before this Court. Shri C. S. Jawa, District and Sessions Judge (retd.) was appointed as the sole arbitrator in terms of the order dated 27. 8. 2003 passed in the said suit.

( 3 ) THE sole arbitrator, respondent no. 2, made and published an award dated 27. 10. 2005. The arbitrator adjudicated upon the claims of the petitioner on merits but the claims were rejected on the ground of being barred by limitation as also the plea of estoppel being found in favour of respondent no. 1. The petitioner has filed the present objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner fairly at inception stated that he would confine his submissions within the narrow compass of scrutiny under Section 34 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 since this Court does not sit as a court of appeal. In fact, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that various claims have been found in favour of the petitioner but the petitioner has been non-suited on grounds of limitation and estoppel. Learned counsel, thus, submitted that his submissions would be based on four broad pleas; (1) Limitation; (2)Invocation of arbitration beyond 90 days of the final bill; (3) Waiver; and (4) the final bill is in full and final settlement of the claims of the petitioner.

( 5 ) A perusal of the award shows that in response to the six claims filed by the petitioner, apart from the claim of interest and costs, respondent no. 1 raised a preliminary objection that the claim was barred by time as the final bill was passed on 20. 3. 2001 which was accepted in full and final settlement by the petitioner. Respondent no. 1 contended that the arbitration clause had not been invoked within 90 days as per clause 25 of the General Conditions of Contract (hereinafter referred to as the GCC) making the claims time barred. It is alleged that the petitioner was informed of the final bill vide letter dated 5. 7. 1999 and he could invoke the arbitration clause within 90 days but actually invoked the same only on 9. 7. 2001. The said bill was accepted in full and final settlement and, thus, the petitioner is stated to have waived his right to make any such claims. It may be noticed here that undisputably the payment was made on 12. 4. 2001.

( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner pointed out that even though the bill may have been passed on 20. 3. 2001, there was no intimation to the petitioner prior to 12. 4. 2001 when he signed the bill and the cheque was received. Thus, the period of 90 days, if applicable, would commence only from 12. 4. 2001.

( 7 ) IN this behalf, learned counsel relied upon the observations made in Suit no. 698-A/1983, M/s Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. International airports Authority of India and Anr. decided on 23. 2. 1984. In the said judgment, B. N. Kirpal, J (as he then was) held that a bill could be said to be ready for payment in respect of such a c