The main legal point established in the judgment is that a decree on the basis of admission in the pleadings must be based on an unequivocal and unambiguous admission, and passing a judgment on this basis is a matter of discretion.

V.K. Shali, J.

1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant against the order dated 4th July, 2000 passed by the learned Single Judge in Suit No. 513-A/1996 by virtue of which a decree for possession in respect of the suit premises has been passed in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs on the basis of an application filed by them bearing IA No. 2217/1998 under Order 12 Rule 6 read with Section 151 of the CPC.

2. Briefly stated the case set up by the appellant/defendant in the appeal is that the appellant/defendant was granted a leave/licence in respect of property bearing No. D-29, S.M.A. Industrial Area, GT Karnal Road, Delhi vide agreement dated 12th June, 1987. The relevant terms and conditions of the agreement are as under:

1) That the licensee have undertaken to pay a sum of Rs. 16,500/- per month excluding consumption charges for industrial power, commercial light and water charges on or before the 7th day of each English calendar month. The payment for industrial power, commercial light and water charges shall be paid by the licensee.

10) That the licensee can terminate this licence/ agreement and vacate the licensed premises after serving one month notice in writing to the licensor.

14) After the completion of 35 months the licensor shall terminate the licence and stop the licencee to use the premises.

It (ought to have been if) the licensor (ought to have been licencee)

prefers to use the premises for next 35 months i.e. for 36th to 70th month, they can do so only with increase of 30% in licence fee. That the licence shall be renewed at the option of licencee for a further successing (ought to have been succeeding) period of 35 months at increased licence fee by 30% over the last licence fee paid.

3. A perusal of the aforesaid conditions would show that though the appellant/defendant was given leave/licence in respect of the premises in question but both the parties in fact intended to grant lease in respect of the property in question, which was originally for a period of 35 months extendable on the discretion of the appellant/defendant for another block of 35 months with the increase of 30% of the licence fee. It is alleged by the appellant/defendant that the respondents/plaintiffs who were claiming themselves to be the owners of the property in question purportedly gave a notice dated 7th December, 1994 to the appellant/defendant asking him to vacate the premises whereafter, the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit for ejectment and permanent injunction against the appellant/defendant.

.4. The appellant/defendant filed a detailed written statement contesting the claim of the respondents/plaintiffs for ejectment. The appellant/defendant took the plea that the respondents/plaintiffs are not the owners though they were the landlords. The quantum of rent being Rs. 16,500/- per month was also not disputed. It was also admitted by the appellant/defendant that a notice of termination dated 7th December, 1994 was received by them. However, it was stated by the appellant/defendant that the said notice dated 7th December, 1994 was totally illegal, unwarranted and in any case stood waived on account of the fact that after the service of the notice the respondents/plaintiffs had increased the rent of the premises in question by 30%, which was accepted by the respondents/plaintiffs.

5. In addition to this, the appellant/defendant had also raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the suit for ejectment and injunction on the ground that according to the terms and conditions of the agreement, the respondents/plaintiffs were to provide 120 H.P. Load of electricity at the premises in question while he was provided only 65 H.P. load because of which upto 31st January, 1988, the appellant/defendant could not carry out his business of manufacturing HDPE granules and other connected activities. The appellant/defendant had suffered losses because of this which have been quantified