The Tribunal does not have the authority to impose restrictions on a citizen's travel and passport in exercise of its powers to pass an interim order under the relevant law.

Mukul Mudgal, J.

1. The writ petition challenges the order dated 27th November, 2007 passed by the Chairman, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi. The facts of the case are as under:

2. The dispute arose from the judgment of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the DRT) in O.A. No. 415/2000 filed by IFCI Ltd. against M/s A.E.C. Ssangyong Ltd. and others for recovery of Rs. 50 crores and odd with pendente lite and future interest. The petitioner herein was the guarantor for the repayment of the said loan amount. Pursuant to the said suit, a recovery certificate was issued where the petitioner was Certificate Debtor No. 2. In these proceedings on 24th December, 2002, the following order was passed:

CD No. 2 through his counsel is directed to deposit his passport with the undersigned immediately. He is directed to file affidavit of assets/movable/immovable and details of bank accounts and details of family members by next date of hearing. CD. No. 2 is directed not to leave the country till further orders from the undersigned.

3. This order was challenged in appeal before the DRT and by the order dated 25th August, 2005 the said challenge was dismissed leading to the appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the DRAT) which led to the impugned order dated 27th November, 2007.

4. The appellant is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal insofar as the order in paragraph 10 deals with the judgment of this Court in the case of A.S. Mittal v. P.O. Debts Recovery Tribunal and Ors. in C.M. (M) No. 505/1999 decided on 21st November, 2003. The Tribunal had distinguished the aforesaid judgment on the ground that in that case the recovery of the liability had not taken place as was done in this case. Therefore, the Tribunals reasoning is to the effect that once a determination of the liability has taken place, the judgment in A.S. Mittals case (supra) rendered by the learned Single Judge does not apply. The relevant portion of the said judgment are as under:

4. A reading of Section 19(6) of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the power of the Tribunal are namely to make interim order whether by way of an injunction or stay against the defendant to debar him from transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing of any property and assets belonging to him without the prior permission of the Tribunal. This certainly does not empower the Tribunal to restrain the petitioner from travel. Section 22(1) of the Act provides for procedure and does not give powers as have been executed by the Tribunal. Needless to say that Rule 18 could not be construed to give powers beyond the substantive section.

5. Having gone through the powers enumerated above. I hold that the Tribunal had no authority whatsoever to either impound the passport of the petitioner or to put any restriction on the travel of the petitioner. In the present case, the Tribunal is entitled to pass interim order in accordance with Section 19(6) of the Act and no more. In this view of the matter, I set aside the order dated 4th May, 1999. However, the petitioner is directed to make himself available before the Tribunal as and when he is required, for which purpose he shall give an undertaking to the Tribunal.

5. The law laid down by the learned single Judge is clear that the Tribunal does not have any power to restrain a citizen from traveling. This determination of law by the learned Single Judge that the Tribunal had no authority whatsoever to either impound the passport of the petitioner or to put any restriction on the travel of the petitioner abroad in exercise of its powers to pass an interim order under Section 19(6) of the Act is not dependent upon determination of liability by the Tribunal. In our view, the judgment has been totally misconstrued by the DRAT in confining it to matters where the liability has not been determined.

6. In our view, thejudgment of the learned Single Judge of this Cour