The main legal point established in the judgment is the discriminatory and arbitrary nature of the NDMC's policy in treating the transferred markets differently from the markets managed by it from before.

Vipin Sanghi, J.

1. I am dealing with the aforesaid two petitions by this common judgment since the facts are more or less identical, except that the specific dates in the two cases are different. The appeals preferred by the petitioners in these two petitions under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Occupation of Unauthorized Occupants) Act ("The Act" for short) have been dismissed by the Ld. Additional District Judge by a common order impugned herein. For the present, I am narrating the relevant facts in W.P.(C) No. 19350/06 preferred by Malarvizhi Elangovan.

2. The Directorate of Estates made an allotment of stall No. 4 DIZ Area, Baba Kharag Singh Marg, New Delhi in favour of one Mohd. Zaffar on licence basis on 5.8.1998. The said allotment was made after inviting a tender. The licence was valid for a period of three years. Clause 16 of the licence deed, being relevant is reproduced herein below:

The allotment of the shop/stall is being made for a limited period of three years. The Government shall, however, sympathetically consider renewal of the licence for a further period of three years with a like term permitting further renewal if the licensee has not been in default of any term of the licence; provided always that the total period of licence together with renewed term shall not in any case exceed 30 years and further that the renewal of the licence, if any, shall be subject to increase in the licence fee as may be found reasonable by the Government and fulfillment by the licensee of such terms and conditions of the licences as may be prescribed by the Government from time to time.

3. During the currency of the said licence, the original licencee, Mohd. Zaffar entered into a partnership with the petitioner on 11.05.1999 to jointly carry out business from the licenced premises.

4. The partnership deed aforesaid was dissolved on 20.1.2002 and the assets and liabilities of the said firm were taken over by the petitioner. The petitioner continued to be in occupation of the stall and also continued to pay the enhanced license fee to the Directorate of Estate.

5. In the allotment letter dated 5.8.1998, it was stipulated that the premises shall not be transferred or sublet to any other person and in case of default, the allotment would be cancelled straightaway and premises resumed by the Government besides taking any other action that the Govt. may be advised. Clause 8 of the licence deed prohibited the licensee from permitting any other person from using the same without the previous consent in writing of the government. In default of the said condition, the licensee was liable for ejectment. The licensee was also precluded from introducing any partner or from parting with possession of the premises or otherwise carrying on any business in the premises with any other person or to assign, transfer, charge or otherwise alienate his interest in the premises.

6. Even prior to the issuance of the licence in favour of Mohd. Zaffar, the Directorate of Estates issued an office order on 25.7.1996. By this order, the Government decided to allow regularization of shops/stalls etc in the names of partners/occupants who had come into occupation of the premises on or before 20.01.1989, on certain terms and conditions.

7. Admittedly the petitioners case was not covered by the said office order since the said order applied only in respect of the shops/stalls and platforms in respect whereof the persons/occupants had come into occupation on or before 20.10.1989.

8. The Directorate of Estates issued a public notice dated 06.08.2001. By this notice, the Director of Estates invited applications from occupants of fourteen markets for grant of ownership rights. Amongst the categories of persons who were eligible for consideration for grant of ownership rights, occupants who had come in undisputed occupation after 20.10.1989 and upto 31.08.2000 were also included. However the petitioners case was not covered by this notice, since the mar