Mool Chand Garg, J.

1. This petition arises out of an order passed by the ASJ, dismissing the second revision petition filed by the petitioner under Section 397 Cr.P.C. whereby he assailed the order passed by Magistrate dismissing his application under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. after the deletion of charges under Section 504 IPC in case FIR No. 247/98 of P.S. Seema Puri.

2. The charge sheet in this case was filed under Section 323/342/347/379/427/504 IPC. The Metropolitan Magistrate after hearing arguments on the question of charge deleted the offences under Section 347/379/427 IPC but directed the petitioner to face trial with respect to offences under Section 323/342/504 IPC. The petitioner then filed a revision petition under Section 397/399 Cr.P.C. which was allowed in part and the offences under Section 504 IPC were also deleted.

3. Subsequently the petitioner filed an application before the MM concerend under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that the challan filed in this case registered on 25.04.1998 on a report filed on 24.04.1998 could not have proceeded further for the offences which were left to be tried under Section 322/323 of the IPC after the order of Additional Sessions Judge deleting the charges under Section 504 IPC, the case has become time barred. By the impugned order the ASJ, Karkardooma who dismissed the revision petition filed second time by the petitioner after his application under Section 468 Cr.P.C. was dismissed, it has been observed that:

Thus, it is seen from the record that in the instant case investigation was carried out against the accused by the investigating Agency in the abovesaid case FIR No. 247/98 dated 25.04.1998 for offences punishable under Sections 323/342/347/379/504 as also 427 IPC on the basis of which police report/challan under the provisions of Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed by the investigation agency in the ld. Trial Court on

27.09.99 on which date the challan was admittedly not time barred for the offences for which it had been filed against the accused as per the provision of Section 468 Cr.P.C.

5. Admittedly, also in the instant case the ld. Trial court has framed charges under Sections 323/341/504 IPC against the accused vide its order dated 28/07/01 and as per the provision of Section 468(3) Cr.P.C. the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. Thus, it can be said in no uncertain terms that the cognizance had been taken by the ld. Trial Court for offences under Section 323/343/504 IPC against the accused on the date on which the challan for the said offences as on said date. It was only on 12/10/01 that charge under Section 504 IPC was dropped against the accused by the Revisional Court on revision by the accused as abovesaid. In my opinion, the said dropping of charge under Section 504 IPC against the accused vide order dated 12/10/01 of the Revisional Court would not render the prosecution of the accused for the remaining offences under Sections 323/342 IPC vide the impugned challan time barred as has been alleged by the ld. Counsel for the revisionist/accused since the impugned challan for the offences for which it had been filed against the accused on the relvant date as above said was not time barred as on said date as per the provision of Section 468 Cr.P.C., as also cognizance of the same had been taken by the ld. Trial Court within the period of limitation for the offences under Sections 323/342/504 IPC against the accused. 6. I find from the record that the ld. Trial court vide its impugned order has also held that it is a settled law that the period of limitation will be reckoned according to the offence charged any order of discharge passed against the accused during the course of trial cannot have retrospective effect to render the summoning order