The main legal point established in the judgment is that the arbitrator's decision under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act 1996 must align with the agreement between the parties and the statutory provisions of the Act. Interim orders and previous court decisions may not be binding, and the rights of the parties are protected through the possibility of compensation.

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

.1. The appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 is preferred against the order dated 4th June, 2009 of the arbitral tribunal dismissing the application of the appellant and allowing the application of the respondent, both under Section 17 of the Act. The appellant is the dealer for retail sale of certain petroleum products of the respondent, from the premises in Sector-51 Gautam Budh Nagar, NOIDA, UP, on the terms and conditions contained in an agreement dated 23rd August, 1995 between the parties. It is inter alia provided in the agreement that the respondent is the owner/lessee of the land underneath the aforesaid premises at NOIDA and all the structures / apparatus/ equipments installed thereon and wherefrom the appellant was permitted to sell and retail petroleum products belong to the respondent. Under Clause 2 of the said agreement the respondent granted leave and licence and permission to the appellant, for the duration of the agreement, to enter on the said premises and to use the premises and the apparatus and equipments installed thereon for the sole and exclusive purpose of storing, selling and handling the products purchased by the appellant as dealer from the respondent; it is further provided therein that the appellant, save in such manner shall have no right, title or interest to the said premises or apparatus or equipments installed thereon and shall not be entitled to claim the right of lessee, sub-lessee, tenant or any other interest in the said premises or outfit; it is also specifically provided therein that the appellant shall not be deemed to be in exclusive possession of the said premises.

2. Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties with respect to the said agreement and the respondent having terminated the dealership of the appellant, the Chairman and Managing Director of the respondent on 13th June, 2008, in accordance with the arbitration clause, in the said agreement, appointed an officer of the respondent as the arbitrator. As aforesaid, the petitioner as well as the respondent preferred application under Section 17 of the Act before the arbitrator; while the appellant sought interim measures in the form of a direction against the respondent to resume sale and supplies of the petroleum products as was being done prior to the letter of termination, to the appellant, during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the respondent sought interim direction against the appellant restraining the appellant from interfering with the respondent resuming the business of sale and supply of petroleum products from the aforesaid premises/retail outlet.

3. The arbitrator has inter alia held that the respondent had purported to terminate the agreement with the appellant on the allegations of stock variation, short delivery and tampering with dispensing units; that though the petitioner had disputed the said grounds but it would not be in the interest of the public that a dealer whose dealership had been terminated for the said reasons should be permitted to operate the retail outlet during the pendency of the arbitration case and unless the issue about the correctness of the said allegation and consequently of the termination of the dealership is decided; that the petitioner in the event of termination being found bad can be compensated; that resultantly the respondent during the pendency of the arbitration case ought to be permitted to operate the retail outlet itself without creating any third party rights therein.

.4. The principles applicable to an appeal under Section 37(2)(b) in my view ought to be the same as the principles in an appeal against an order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC i.e., unless the discretion exercised by the court against whose order the appeal is preferred is found to have been exercised perversely and contrary to law, the appellate court ought not to interfere with the order merely because the appellate court in t