The main legal point established in the judgment is that the grounds stipulated under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 must be satisfied for remitting the award to the Arbitrator for reconsideration.

MUKUL MUDGAL,J.

1. This is an appeal filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act?) read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act against order dated 10th September, 2007 and 26th March, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in Suit No. 340/1993. The order dated 26th March, 2009 arose from IA No. 11993/2007 which sought the appointment of any person as an Arbitrator for adjudication of the claims set aside by the learned Single Judge on the objections filed by the respondent-Union of India in respect of the Award dated 19th January, 1993.

2. The learned Single Judge noted the following facts: -

a. Upon a reference of disputes, an arbitration award dated 19th January, 1993 was passed.

b. In respect of the said award, objections under Section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 were filed by the respondent and which were partly allowed by a judgment dated 10th September, 2007, also belatedly challenged in this appeal, claims no.1, 2, 9 and 10 were made rule of the Court whereas award in respect of claims no.6 and 7 were set aside and the objections in respect of the said claims by the respondent were sustained.

3. Before the learned Single Judge, reliance was placed on Section 16 of the Act which reads as under: -

“16. Power to remit award.- The Court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit-

(a) Where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred; or

(b) Where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution; or

(c) Where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it.

(2) Where an award is remitted under sub-section (1) the Court shall fix the time within which the arbitrator or umpire shall submit his decision to the court; Provided that any time so fixed may be extended by subsequent order of the Court.

(3) An award remitted under sub-section (1) shall become void on the failure of the arbitrator or umpire to reconsider it and submit his decision within the time fixed.”

4. The learned Single Judge has held that the Award in respect of claims no.6 and 7 having been set aside upon objections by the respondent, there was no scope for application of Section 16 and 17 of the Act.

5. The learned Single Judge also held that by the said application, the appellant was in effect seeking the review of the judgment dated 10th September, 2007 qua claims no.6 and 7. It was also noted that the decree had already been passed in terms of the judgment dated 10th September, 2007 and there was no warrant for modifying the decree.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sandeep Sharma, has again relied upon Section 16 to contend that the award with respect to claims no.6 and 7 ought to have been remitted back to the Arbitrator. 7. The only relevant portion of the application which can said to be containing the cause of action under Section 16 is paragraph 4 of the application which reads as under :

“The petitioner submits that this Hon?ble Court vide order dated 10th September, 2007 set aside claims No.6 & 7. However the same were not remanded and no arbitrator was appointed for fresh consideration of those claims. The petitioner submits that as the Ld. Arbitrator has misconducted in view of the findings recorded by this Hon?ble Court and it is respectfully prayed that the Arbitrator may be appointed for adjudication of those claims.” There is therefore absolutely no cause of action pleaded for seeking remission of the matter back to the Arbitrator for fresh adjudication, even assuming such application could have been filed.

8. Furthermore, the plea of the appellant is wholly fallacious as it was not as if the award had left any of the matters re