A contract determinable by nature cannot be specifically enforced under Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and compensation for breach provides an adequate remedy.

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

1. By this order, I shall dispose of three applications being I.A. No.3331/2009 filed by the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, I.A. No.6237/2009 filed by the defendant under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC seeking vacation of the ad interim injunction order dated 13th March, 2009 and I.A. No.6232/2009 filed by the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint.

2. Brief facts are that the plaintiffs have filed the present suit for mandatory injunction praying that a decree be passed against the defendant with a direction to register the Lease Deed dated 5th September, 2008 in terms of the covenants contained in the Letter of Intent dated 21st August, 2008.

3. The case of the plaintiffs is that in the month of August, 2008 the plaintiffs were approached by the defendant through one property dealer for taking the suit premises on rent. After negotiations between the parties, the defendant agreed to take the suit premises on rent and thereby issued a Letter of Intent dated 21st August, 2008 which is duly signed by the plaintiffs and the defendant for a period of five years at a monthly rent of Rs.3,45,342/- i.e. @ Rs.150/- per sq. ft. + service tax.

4. After issuing the Letter of Intent as aforesaid, the defendant paid two months rent i.e. Rs.6,90,684/- in favour of the plaintiffs which was adjusted towards the security deposit. The exit clause provided three months notice after the expiry of 24 months locking period from the effective period i.e. 1st October, 2008.

5. The plaintiffs contended that in view of the Letter of Intent, they completed the interior work which was under progress and made all necessary changes as per the requirement of the defendant and in the said process, they incurred about Rs.20 lakhs expense for the same. On 5th September, 2008 a Lease Deed on the stamp paper of Rs.66,000/- was duly executed between the parties. The plaintiffs handed over the possession of the suit premises to the defendant on 1st October, 2008 and thereafter the defendant started paying rent to the plaintiffs in terms of the said Lease Deed.

6. The plaintiffs requested the defendant a number of times to complete its part of the obligation by registering the said Lease Deed in terms of covenants i.e. Clause 8(vii) but on one pretext or the other, the defendant failed and neglected to do so. Therefore, the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant.

7. As per the relief prayed for registration of the Lease Deed dated 5th September, 2008 in the suit, the plaintiffs have also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC being I.A. No.3331/2009 and ex parte ad interim injunction was issued on 13th March, 2009 directing that the defendant shall continue to act upon the terms and conditions contained in proposed Lease Deed dated 5th September, 2008.

8. The defendant filed its written statement as well as an application being I.A. No.6232/2009, under Order VII Rule 11 r/w Section 151 CPC and another application being I.A. No.6237/2009 under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC for vacation of the abovementioned ex-parte interim injunction.

9. The main contention of the defendant is that the suit filed by the plaintiffs for injunction is specifically barred under Section 14(1)(c) r/w Section 41(h) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. It has been contended that the Lease Deed provides a termination clause and any such contract which is by its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced under Section 14(1)(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963.

10. It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the defendant that the Lease Deed provides for the amount of rent as well as for the interest to be charged in case of any delay or breach or non-performance of any terms and conditions of the lease deed, therefore, compensation can be claimed in case of default and is an adequate relief. Therefore, no injunction can be granted in view of Section 4