The presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not irrebuttable, and the burden of proof lies on the accused to rebut the presumption of liability for dishonoured cheques.

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.- The revisicnist claims to be aggrieved against the concurrent findings of the Metropolitan Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, convicting him of offences under Sections 138/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereafter referred to as the Act).

2. The petitioner had issued two cheques for Rs. 10,000/-, to the second respondent/complainant. The cheques were dishonoured, upon their presentation, on 7.10.1994, for insufficient funds. Notice under Section 138 was issued to the petitioner on 17.10.1994; he disclaimed liability, by his reply dated 25.10.1994. The second respondent filed a complaint, which culminated with the petitioners conviction; he was also directed to deposit Rs. 20,000/- as fine and remit Rs. 1.000/- as costs of the prosecution. The judgment and the order on sentence dated 8.10.1998 were appealed against by the petitioner. The learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the appeal on 31.8.2000.

3. Mr. Yarun Goswami, learned Counsel alleged that both the Courts fell into error in not appreciating that the cheques were not issued in discharge of any legal debt or liability. It was submitted that the petitioner was a tenant of the payees father and therefore there was no transaction between him and the payee which made him legally liable in that regard. According to Counsel the entire case set up by the prosecution about extending of a friendly loan by the payee, Shri P.K. Jain was a falsehood and fraught with improbabilities. Counsel took me through the copies of depositions of the complainant and submitted that apart from his assertion, there was no material to support the finding that an informal loan was given to the petitioner.

4. It was also contended that the presumption under Section 118 of the Act is not irrebuttable; in the circumstances of this case, the Court should have read between the lines and drawn an inference that the cheques were not backed with any consideration. Elaborating on this, Counsel submitted that the deposition of the payee contained an admission that the amounts were paid in the presence of a third party; yet he was not examined. Counsel faulted the findings of the Court below in what he termed as application of differing standards. He submitted that the Courts fell into error in holding that the payees/complainants father, Shri S.P. Jain ought to have been summoned by him. On the other hand, the logic of that reasoning was not applied to the complainant, who was absolved of the onus to prove the allegations about advancing money, even though he failed to produce any independent witness.

5. The contentions raised before this Court are not novel. They were raised in the Courts below. A look at the deposition of the complainant would reveal that the petitioner specifically suggested that no amount as claimed were advanced; they were denied. The complaint unambiguously mentioned about the petitioner borrowing Rs. 10,000/- from him. The petitioner did not deny issuance of the cheque in his reply. He merely gave his version that the amount was payable to Sh. S.P. Jain. In these circumstances, the Courts below weighed the rival contentions and concluded that the petitioner had not been able to substantiate his contentions. As regards the other issues namely, that the Courts applied differing standards, 1 am of the view that even if those observations were to be ignored, there was sufficient material to support the findings of the Courts about the petitioners liability.

6. This Court in revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 is not expected to sit as a second Appellate Court and scrutinize minutiae of findings. Its jurisdiction is of a limited and circumscribed nature and more concerned with the approach of the Courts and the regularity of proceedings. Upon a consideration of the materials on record, I am satisfied that no interference is called for in the exercise of such jurisdiction.

7. For the above reasons, the petition cannot succeed; it