Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. This petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) has been filed challenging the Award made by the Arbitral Tribunal on 10.05.2007.

.2. By virtue of the impugned Award the petitioners claim was found to be barred by time. The Arbitral Tribunal referred to Chapter XI of the bye-laws framed by the

.National Stock Exchange of India. The said Chapter pertains to arbitration. Byelaw (3) of Chapter XI stipulates the limitation period for reference of claims, differences or disputes for arbitration. It stipulates that all claims, differences or disputes referred to in bye-laws (1), (1A), (1B) and (1D) shall be submitted to arbitration within six months from the date on which the claim, difference or dispute arises or is deemed to have been arisen. It further provides that time taken in conciliation proceedings, if any, initiated and conducted as per the provisions of the said Act and the time taken by the Relevant Authority to administratively resolve the claim, differences or disputes shall be excluded for the purpose of determining the period of six months. The Arbitral Tribunal took the view that transactions between the petitioner and the respondent stopped on 01.04.2004 and that would be regarded as the starting point of limitation. The Arbitral Tribunal expressed its opinion that it cannot be believed that for more than two years a person would wait and suddenly wake up with his claim as in this case. According to the Arbitral Tribunal the period of six months had expired and thereforee the claim for arbitration could not be entertained. The Arbitral Tribunal was also of the view that subsequent acknowledgment may extend the period of limitation for the purposes of a civil suit under the Limitation Act, 1963 but for the purposes of arbitration the period had already expired. The Arbitral Tribunal also took the view that a clear distinction must be drawn between the right of the claimant in a civil suit and the present proceedings. It was observed that the arbitration proceedings under the bye-laws only bars the remedy in these proceedings and does not take away the right to enforce the same under the civil law in a court. Ultimately the Tribunal held that the claim is time barred so far as the tribunal was concerned. They, however, made it clear that nothing said in the Award would amount to any expression of opinion pertaining to the disputes on merits of the matter and that nothing restrained the claimant to take his remedy before the civil court in accordance with law because the period of limitation there is different.

.3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in his submissions has assailed the impugned Award on primarily two grounds. The first ground that was taken by the learned Counsel was that the Arbitral Tribunal has overlooked certain material documents, which, if considered, would bring the petitioners claim within the period prescribed by bye-law (3) of the said bye-law. The second point urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the provision of a reduced period of limitation compared to the period prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 would be hit by the provisions of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that the Tribunal has correctly understood the provisions and the factual situation and has taken the view that the claim was time barred. He has also submitted that the computation of the period of limitation has been appropriately done by the Arbitral Tribunal. On the second point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 would not come in the way of the present bye-law (3) inasmuch as Section 28 only refers to agreements between parties and does not refer to statutory provisions.

.The period of limitation prescribed under by