Vikramajit Sen, J.

Crl. M.As. 4172-73/2008

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions. WP(Crl.) 425/2008 & Crl. M.A. 4171/2008

2. This Petition was originally listed before a Single Judge of this Court. The Petition contains two prayers - (a) for declaring the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short Act) as ultra virus the Constitution of India and (b) to quash the proceedings before the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi. Very briefly stated, the Petitioner admits that a Ring Ceremony had been performed between him and Respondent No. 2, but no marriage had been celebrated. Respondent No. 2 however appears to have taken the stance that their marriage was duly solemnized.

3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has assailed the virus of the Act on the ground that inasmuch as it provides protection only to women and not to men, the statute offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is beyond cavil that legislation must be presumed to be legally sound and proper, and thereforee the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional rests heavily on the Petitioner who asserts so. It has been laid down that if it is evident that a statute is predicated on an intelligible differentia between persons falling within the protection of the provision viz-a-viz those falling outside, and this classification/differentia bears a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation, it would not infract or impinge upon the equality doctrine articulated and enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. We can do no better than to reproduce the following paragraph from State of A.P. v. Nallamilli Rami Reddi AIR 2001 SC 3616 which has also been relied upon in Basheer v. State of Kerala 2004 CriL 1418 :

...

8. What Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is class legislation and not classification for purpose of legislation. If the legislature reasonably classifies persons for legislative purposes so as to bring them under a well-defined class, it is not open to challenge on the ground of denial of equal treatment that the law does not apply to other persons. The test of permissible classification is twofold: (i) that the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together from others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational connection to the object sought to be achieved. Article 14 does not insist upon classification, which is scientifically perfect or logically complete. A classification would be justified unless it is patently arbitrary. If there is equality and uniformity in each group, the law will not become discriminatory, though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising out of (sic) peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others so long as they are not singled out for special treatment. In substance, the differentia required is that it must be real and substantial, bearing some just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.

4. Domestic violence is a worldwide phenomenon and has been discussed in International fora, including the Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995). The United Nations Committee Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has recommended that States should act to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family. There is a perception, not unfounded or unjustified, that the lot and fate of women in India is an abjectly dismal one, which requires bringing into place, on an urgent basis, protective and ameliorative measures against exploitation of women. The argument that the Act is ultra virus the Constitution of India because it accords protection only to women and not to men is, thereforee, wholly devoid of any merit. We do not rule out the possibility of a man becoming the victim of domestic violence, but such cases w