PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.

1. While dealing with Bail Application No.1514/2007, a learned Single Judge of this Court has made a reference to a larger Bench on the question, whether the bar of Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) operates as a complete bar to the maintainability of

petitions/applications under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

2. Section 18 of the Act read as under:- “18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act.– Nothing in Section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act.”

3. Since we are in complete agreement with the view taken by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court reported as 2000 Crl.L.J. 2899 Virender Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, in which decision various authorities on the subject have been noted, we propose to pen a short decision for the reason the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has extensively dealt with the issue and in our opinion on sound reasoning; which we adopt.

4. The Parliament, in its wisdom has evinced great concern and anxiety with respect to the unabated atrocities going on against members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The legislative mandate oozes through Section 18 of the said Act which disables an accused from obtaining anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

5. As the saying goes: the disease growing up desperately must be treated desperately else no. Atrocities against members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are unabatedly going on since last hundreds of years and thus there cannot be two views about the strictest possible view pertaining to matters involving atrocities on the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

6. But, a beneficial legislation can never be permitted to be abused and converted into an instrument to blackmail and wreck personal vengeance for settling and scoring personal vendetta. A torch which is lighted to dispel darkness cannot be permitted to set on fire its surroundings.

7. Applied mechanically and blindly, Section 18 of the Act would virtually tantamount to abdicating and relegating the judicial duty of considering at least the question whether the allegations taken on their face value constitute an offence under the Act.

8. The words ‘accusation of having committed the offence under this Act’ are the guiding words of Section 18 of the Act.

9. The word „accuse means „a claim that someone has done something wrong. Thus, an accusation is complete if it has all the ingredients required by law for a claim that someone has done something wrong.

10. Various clauses of Section 3 of the Act enumerate the offences created by the Act. Thus, a person can properly be said to be accused of an offence under the Act if the allegations read as they are evidence that the ingredients of the offence are made out. A statement of fact which does not make out the ingredients of the offence would be an accusation „improperly so called.

11. Thus, it is apparent that the bar created by Section 18 of the Act would not apply merely because an FIR has been registered under the Act. It would always remain within the domain and the jurisdiction of the Court to judicially consider whether the allegations in the FIR prima facie make out an offence under the Act and if it is found so, only then can it be said that there is an accusation of having committed the offence under the Act.

12. As clarified by the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, while entertaining and considering an application seeking anticipatory bail, the jurisdiction of the Court would be limited to read the allegations in the complaint and satisfy itself whether or not the allegations disclose the commission