Delhi High Court
V. S. DESHPANDE,H. L. ANAND
Azizan Bi - Appellant
Versus
Ganga Dhar - Respondent
S.A.O. No. 252 of 1973
Decided On : 04/03/1978
RENT CONTROL ACT - S.38 - APPEAL - ORDER REFUSING STAY OF DISPOSSESSION - APPEALABLE - S.25 - INDEPENDENT TITLE - CLAIMANT - STAY OF DISPOSSESSION - DISCRETION OF CONTROLLER - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.
Fact of the Case:
The question referred to the Bench was whether an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal under S.38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) against an order passed by the Controller under S.25 of the Act refusing to stay dispossession of a person claiming an independent title to the premises.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal under S.38 of the Act against an order passed by the Controller under S.25 of the Act refusing to stay dispossession of a person claiming an independent title to the premises.
Issues: Whether an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal under S.38 of the Act against an order passed by the Controller under S.25 of the Act refusing to stay dispossession of a person claiming an independent title to the premises.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that an order granting or refusing stay of dispossession in a proceeding under the proviso to S.25 is an order which affects the right to legal possession claimed against each other by the landlord and the claimant. It is, therefore, an order affecting the rights and liabilities of these parties. It is, therefore, appealable under Section 38(1) in accordance with the ratio of the Supreme Court decision mentioned above.
Final Decision: The court set aside the orders of the Rent Control Tribunal and directed the Controller or Additional Controllers to dispose of the applications under the proviso to S.25 within a period of three months.
V. S. DESHPANDE, J. :- The only question referred for consideration to this Bench is whether an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal under S.38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against an order passed by the Controller under S.25 of the Act refusing to stay dispossession of a person claiming an independent title to the premises which are alleged to be in his possession.
2. The proceedings under the Act are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure as far as it is applicable in view of S.37(2) of the Act. An order of eviction passed under S.14 in favour of the landlord is executable against the tenant as a decree of a Civil Court under Section 42 of the Act. Rule 23 made under the Act reiterates the provision of Section 37(2). It would, therefore, appear that an application for the execution of an order for eviction stands on the same footing as an application for execution of a decree in the Civil Court.
3. Section 25 which determines the scope of the operation of the order for eviction in the executing court is as follows :
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of a tenant in any premises is determined for any reason whatsoever and any order is made by the Controller under this Act for the recovery of possession of such premises, the order shall, subject to the provisions of S.18, be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises and vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons therefrom :
Provided that nothing in this Section shall apply to any person who has an independent title to such premises."
4. The argument centres round the words "all persons who may be in occupation of the premises" and the words "by evicting all such persons therefrom." The reason is this. A decree can be executed only against the persons on whom it is binding, namely, the parties and persons who claimed through the parties. S.25, however, is couched in wider terms. It allows the order of eviction to be executed against all persons in occupation of the premises. The first question which could have arisen for consideration is whether the wider language of S.25 is a departure from the general principle underlying the Code of Civil Procedure that a decree binds only the parties and persons claiming through them. That question has, however, been already answered by a Division Bench in Vidyawanti v. Taken Dass, 1974 Ren CR 47 (Delhi) holding that S.25 does not depart from the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the persons in occupation liable to be evicted are only those who claimed through the tenant. This was why the proviso to Section 25 says that "nothing in this Section shall apply to any person who has an independent title to such premises."
5. When, therefore, a person claiming an independent title to such premises makes an application that the order for eviction should not be executed against him, such application has to be considered by the Controller. As was held in Vidyawanti's case (1974 Ren CR 47) (Delhi) "an independent title" means a claim to the occupation of the premises otherwise than through or on behalf of the tenant against whom the order for eviction is passed. The fact that a decision of the Controller as to such independent title may not be final and the residuary jurisdiction of the Civil court to finally adjudicate a question of title is preserved by Section 50(4) of the Act does not mean that the Controller can refuse to consider the claim of an independent title set up before him under the proviso to Section 25.
6. During the investigation of such a claim it would be a matter of the greatest importance whether the existing possession of the premises held by the claimant is protected or not. If the person claiming independent title applies for stay of dispossession till his application is decided, what is the Controller to consider in granting or refusing an interim stay of d
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