1. By the present appeal, the Appellant challenges the judgment of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate acquitting the Respondents for commission of offence under Section 29 (2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957(in short the D.D. Act).

2. Briefly, the version of the Complainant CW-2 Shri R.K. Gupta, Junior Engineer is that he inspected premises No.2, Kohat Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi on 24th November, 1993 and found a nursing home functioning under the name of M/s. Gautam Hospital in the basement in an area of 800 sq. ft. and on the ground, first and second floors in an area of about 1800 sq. ft. each. This premises fell under Development zone No.H-5 and could be used for residential purposes only. On a complaint being filed, the Respondents pleaded not guilty. After recording the Complainant’s evidence, statements of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and the defence evidence, the Respondents were acquitted. The learned Trial Court acquitted the Respondents primarily on the ground that during the inspection, the Complainant CW-2 neither seized any document to prove the fact that a hospital was functioning on the date of inspection nor could he give the name of any patient, nurse, staff member, employee or associate doctor and thus for want of corroboration, the oral testimony of this witness was found insufficient to convict the Respondents for the offence charged.

3. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that CW-2 Junior Engineer inspected the premises and also exhibited the report of inspection Ex. CW2/A demonstrating the area under violation. The Appellant examined CW-1 Subhash Chand from the Income Tax Department to prove the fact that M/s Gautam Hospital was being run at the premises by a partnership firm comprising of partners Sh. D.K. Sehgal and Smt. Veena Sehgal. According to the learned counsel, the testimony of CW1 sufficiently corroborates the testimony of CW2. Relying on Tahir v. State (Delhi), 1996 SCC (Cri) 515 and Karamjit Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), 2003 CRI.L.J. 2021, it is contended that the testimony of an official witness can be relied upon for conviction and no corroboration thereto is necessary. In the statements of the Respondents recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. they have admitted the factum of the firm running a poly clinic. Reliance is also placed on Section 32 of the DD Act to contend that the partners of the firm are also liable for the offences committed by the firm. In view of the serious infirmities in the impugned judgment, the same be set aside and the Respondents be convicted or the offence charged with.

4. Learned counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, contends that there is no sanction granted by the competent authority against the Respondent No.1 firm, hence, for lack of sanction neither the firm nor even its partners can be prosecuted and convicted. The sanction is granted on a cyclostyled proforma, wherein merely the blanks have been filled, which depicts non-application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. Hence, no cognizance could have been taken on the basis of such a sanction. The documents exhibited by CW-2 were photocopies and thus reliance cannot be placed on them and this objection was taken by the Respondents during the trial itself. There being no infirmity in the impugned judgment, no interference is called for in the present appeal.

5. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent to the extent that for lack of sanction, Respondent No.1 i.e. M/s Gautam Hospital cannot be prosecuted is well founded. A perusal of the sanction order, Ex. CW 3/A shows that the sanction for prosecution has been granted only against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 i.e., Sh. D.K. Sehgal and Smt. Veena Sehgal. In the absence of any sanction against Respondent No.1, it can neither be prosecuted nor convicted. However, the next contention of the learned counsel that in the