INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)

C.M.No.326/2011 Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions. RSA No.3/2011 & C.M.No.325/2011

1. This appeal has impugned the judgment and decree dated 1.11.2010 which has endorsed the finding of the Trial Judge dated 21.4.2009, whereby the suit of the plaintiff, Shri K.P. Bansal, seeking a decree of declaration and mandatory injunction to the effect that his resignation letter dated 18.8.1991 had been obtained under pressure and coercion was decreed in his favour. A decree of declaration was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant that the said resignation was obtained by force by the defendant; decree for mandatory injunction had also been passed directing the reinstatement of the plaintiff with full back wages and consequential benefits with effect from 18.8.1991. 2. The plaintiff had been selected in the Sanatam DharamSaraswati Bal Mandir School, Punjabi Bagh as a TGT Maths teacher. He worked there for about 12 years. On 18.8.1991, the plaintiff was called to the school and forced to write a letter of resignation. The plaintiff lodged a police complaint dated 24.8.1991. A representation to the Director of Education was also forwarded on 26.8.1991 to which no reply was received. The appeal filed by the plaintiff before the appellate body i.e., the Delhi School Education Tribunal was dismissed on 11.6.1992. The plaintiff also filed a writ petition wherein it was observed that the dispute raised by the plaintiff could only be decided by a suit. The present suit was accordingly filed.

3. In the written statement the contention was that the plaintiff had voluntarily accepted his guilt by tendering his letter dated 19.8.1991. His resignation was not given under force or coercion. The suit was also not maintainable in the present form.

4. The Trial Judge had framed the following nine issues:-

“1. Whether on 18.08.1991, defendant No.4 took the resignation of the plaintiff forcibly as averred in para-6 of the plaint? OPP.

2. Whether plaintiff is entitled to decree for mandatory injunction as prayed for? OPP.

3. Whether approval given by defendant No.2 deserves to be declared as null and void as same has been sought and had come beyond the prescribed time as prescribed by rules no.114 A of the Delhi School Education Rules? OPP.

4. Whether the management sanctioned the resignation is proper or not? OPP.

5. Whether suit as framed is not maintainable? OPD.

6. Whether present suit is barred by provisions of Section 25 of the Delhi School Education Rules? OPD.

7. Whether suit of the plaintiff is barred by principle of resjudicata and the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit? OPD.

8. Whether the conduct of the plaintiff is such as to disentitle him to the discretionary relief of declaration and injunction? OPD.

9. Relief.”

5. On the basis of the oral and the documentary evidence led by the respective parties, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed.

6. The First Appellate Court had endorsed this finding.

7. This is a second appeal. On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged that the impugned judgment is a perversity; the circumstances and the background in which this resignation had been tendered and accepted by the defendants has not been adverted to; the impugned judgment has only gone into the question as to whether the resignation letter dated 18.8.1991 was voluntary or involuntary; the other prior circumstances have been ignored. The Court has overlooked the fact that the racket of fake certificates was going on in the school since April, 1991 and in fact a complaint to the said effect had also been forwarded to the concerned Police Station in May, 1991. On 9.8.1991, the plaintiff had voluntarily admitted his guilt.

All these prior circumstances have been illegally ignored. The finding in the impugned judgment are perverse and liable to be set aside as the relevant evidence has been ignored. For this proposition, reliance has been pla