1. In both these appeals, the concerned body is Krishak Bharati Cooperative Ltd. („KRIBHCO?for the sake of brevity). The question posed is as to whether it is discharging any public function and, thus, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 15.2.2002 passed in W.P.(C) No.189/1996 (out of which LPA No.291/2002 arises) by referring to the judgment dated 09.1.2002 in W.P.(C) No.3035/1999 and other connected matters titled R.K. Mishra and Others Vs. Krishak Bharti Co-operative Limited (Kribhco), which is a society registered under the Registration Act, is not to be treated as “another authority” or “instrumental or agency of the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, having regard to the constitution of the society and its bye-laws, etc. inasmuch as none of the test laid down by the Supreme Court on this aspect are fulfilled. In the appeal, challenge on this count is given up. However, the submission was that since KRIBHCO discharges public functions, it would still be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

1. 3. In LPA No.719/2002, KRIBHCO is in appeal. Here the learned Single Judge in its impugned order dated 12.8.2002 has taken the view that even if KRIBHCO is not State under Article 12 of the Constitution, there is no impediment in invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, if any, of the fundamental rights as enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are affected. In the brief order passed by the learned Single Judge for taking this view, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey and Ors. [(1999) 1 SCC 741].

2. 4. Thus, the pure legal question which arises for consideration before us is identical in both the appeals on which submissions were made by the counsel for the parties.

3. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant appearing in LPA No.291/2002 pointed out that in this very appeal, the Division Bench on earlier occasion had decided the issue vide judgment dated 03.10.2006. After detailed analysis, it had come to the conclusion that KRIBHCO was discharging public function and, therefore, it was amenable to writ jurisdiction. However, KRIBHCO had approached the Supreme Court challenging the said order and vide order dated 25.8.2008, the Supreme Court set aside the said order and remitted the case back for fresh consideration only because the reason that while deciding maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Division Bench had not referred to counter affidavit filed by the Central Government and also did not consider the bye-laws of the society as amended upto March, 1995. His plea was that the Central Government in its affidavit has taken the position that KRIBHCO is not a State under Article 226 of the Constitution. Bye-laws of KRIBHCO society are also pressed into service from this angle. On this basis, it was his submission that since the said counter affidavit or bye-laws have no bearing on the issue of whether KRIBHCO is discharging any public function or not, the earlier opinion expressed by the Division Bench vide orders dated 03.10.2006 needs to be reiterated. The learned counsel took us through that judgment wherein the character and functions of KRIBHCO are examined in detail to hold that it has discharged public function.

1. 6. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the KRIBHCO, on the other hand, submitted that once the judgment dated 03.10.2006 has been set aside by the Supreme Court, the appellant cannot place any reliance thereupon and the issue needs to be examined afresh in the light of the submissions made by the counsel before this Bench.

2. 7. It goes without saying that since the earlier judgment is set aside,