RAJIV SHAKDHER, J.

1. The captioned appeal impugns the order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.02.2012 passed in Execution Petition No. 286/2011. The only submission made before us, by the learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the appeal is that, the warrants of possession issued qua the immovable property i.e., land comprising in Mustatil No. 90, Killa No. 11/2, Mustatil No. 91, Killa Nos. 7/1, 7/2, 14, 17, 15/2 and 16, total admeasuring 17 Bighas and 4½ Biswas, situated within the revenue estate of Village Dera Mandi, Delhi (hereinafter referred to in short as the property) ought not to have been issued, as the execution petition was not maintainable, in view of it being barred, by limitation. In support of this submission learned counsel for the appellant Mr Pramod Ahuja, relied upon Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the Limitation Act).

2. We are in these circumstances called upon to decide as to whether in the factual matrix, which obtains in the instant case, the execution petition filed, was instituted, beyond the prescribed period of limitation. In order to appreciate the issue raised by the appellant, the following facts are required to be noticed:

2.1 Respondent no. 1, who is the decree holder in the present case, had instituted a suit, on 10.10.1988 being CS(OS) : 2524/1988, to seek specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 02.05.1988 (in short agreement). To be noted this agreement was executed between respondent no. 1 and respondent nos. 2 to 4 alongwith appellant nos. 1 and 2 (collectively referred to as the vendors); being the other party in the said agreement. The total sale consideration, as set out in the agreement, is a sum of Rs 7,20,000/-. It is not in dispute, that over a period of time respondent no. 1 paid a sum of Rs 2,50,000/-.

2.2. It appears that the vendors did not proceed to execute a sale deed, which propelled respondent no. 1 to institute the aforementioned suit for specific performance. Since, despite service of summons, (which were admittedly received by respondent no. 4, i.e., Satpal) no appearance was put in by the vendors, by an order dated 06.11.1989, the vendors, who were impleaded in the suit, were proceeded ex-parte.

2.3. It appears that the vendors took no immediate steps to retrieve the situation, which resulted in the court proceeding to decree the suit against the vendors based on the evidence placed before it by respondent no. 1. The judgment and decree thus came to be passed on 15.11.1990. Interestingly, respondent no. 1 in its suit had only sought a decree of specific performance of the agreement referred to above, which was granted by the court with a direction that the balance sale consideration be deposited by her, in court, within two weeks. The vendors, who were the defendants in the suit, were directed to take steps for execution and registration of the “sale deed” within two weeks of the deposit of the sale consideration, failing which the Registrar of this Court was directed to take necessary steps for execution and registration of the sale deed.

2.4. It is not in dispute that the vendors took no steps towards execution of the sale deed and consequently the Registrar of this court executed a sale deed dated 22.10.1991, in favour of respondent no. 1.

2.5. A perusal of the list of dates filed by the appellant, would show that admittedly, respondent no. 1 had taken out proceedings before the Revenue Assistant for mutation of the property in issue, in her favour. These proceedings were taken out in 1992. According to the appellant, on 23.11.1994, the Revenue Assistant declined the request for mutation as it was made in contravention of Section 33 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954 (in short DLR Act).

2.6 Undeniably, against the order dated 23.11.1994 a revision petition was filed by one of the vendors. This revision petition was filed on 04.07.1995. The appellants in the present proceedings were made parties to the revision pet