The jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 is limited to lands falling within the specific definition of a 'holding' under Section 3(11a) of the Act.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J

1. This case is on the Regular Board of this Court since 19.3.2012. No one appears for the respondents although it is 2.45 P.M. I have heard counsel for the appellant and after perusing the record am proceeding to dispose of the appeal.

2. The challenge by means of this Regular First Appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is to the impugned judgment of the Trial Court dated 7.5.2005 dismissing the suit filed for partition and permanent injunction on the ground that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction by virtue of Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, i.e. the suit should have been filed before the Court of Revenue Assistant and not before the Civil Court.

3. A reference to the impugned judgment shows that the Trial Court has referred to the definition of land as contained in Section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and has held that all types of lands, i.e. whether they are residential/abadi lands or agricultural lands, are subject matter of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, and therefore the suit in Civil Court is barred under Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. The relevant observations of the Trial Court in this regard read as under:-

“8. Section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act provides as under: Section 3(13) Definition: In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (13) “Land “Except in Section 23 and 24, means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture, or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming and includes:

a) Buildings appurtenant thereto.

b) village abadis,

c) Gravelands,

d) lands for village pasture or land covered by water and used for growing sigharas and other produce or land in the bed of a river and used for casual or occasional cultivation. But does not include---- Land occupied by building in belts of areas adjacent to Delhi town and New Delhi town, which the Chief Commissioner may by a notification in the official Gazette declare as an acquisition thereto.

10. It was held in the case law reported as 39 (1989) DLT 58 (in the matter of Kasturi (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Gaon Sabha) that in respect of the land which is defined u/s 3(13) Delhi Land Reforms Act, the civil court has no jurisdiction. Similarly, in the case law reported as 1983 Delhi 216 the same ratio was applied and it was held that where ever the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred specifically u/s 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, the civil court has no jurisdiction.

11. Further, in the case law reported as 42 (1990) DLT 44 it was held that the land occupied by buildings also falls within the definition of Abadi land. The land which falls within the definition of Section 3(13) of Delhi Land Reforms Act, is a land of village Abadi and that it excludes only that land which is occupied by buildings in belts of areas adjacent to Delhi town and New Delhi town, which the Chief Commissioner, may by notification in the official Gazette declare as acquisition thereto, meaning thereby that there should be a notification by the Chief Commissioner in respect of buildings or in respect of the land occupied by buildings adjacent to Delhi town and New Delhi town of the village abadi and only then they could be taken out from the ambit of the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act.

12. It is, therefore, clear that once the and sought to be partitioned in the suit falls within the ambit of section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is clearly barred u/s 185 of Delhi Land Reforms Act. And when the jurisdiction of the civil court is specifically barred, the preliminary issue stated herein above is required to be answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants. The preliminary issue (i.e., issue no.1) is, accordingly, answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants.”

4. The Trial Court, in my opinion, has clearly misdirected itself inasmuch as though