Once an authority or body is established or constituted in any manner prescribed in Clause (a) to (d) of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, there is no further requirement of such a body to be either owned or controlled or substantially financed by an appropriate Government.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, A.K. SIKRI

1. The appellant in both these appeals, is the Delhi Sigh Gurudwara Management Committee, which is held to be a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the “RTI Act”) by the learned Single Judge vide impugned judgment dated 22.7.2010, which is a common judgment in both the cases. Section 2(h) of the RTI Act reads as under:

“2(h) “public authority” means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted, -

(a) by or under the Constitution;

(b) by any other law made by Parliament;

(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;

(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any-

(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

(ii) Non-Government Organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.”

2. Though Section is published in the Bare Act in the aforesaid manner, there is little difference in the publication in Official Gazette as far as its placement of the provision is concerned. Since it has significant bearing on the interpretation sought to be suggested by the counsel for the parties, we reproduce the provision published in the Official Gazette as well which reads as under:

“2 (h) “public authority” means any authority or institution of self-government established or constituted –

(a) by or under the Constitution;

(b) by any other law made by Parliament;

(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;

(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any-

(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.”

3. Submission of Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, was that in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, the words “and includes any” occurring after Section 2(h)(d) have to be read conjunctively and, therefore, even if a body fell within the definition of a public authority under Section 2(h)(a) to (d), such a body would have to be substantially financed “directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government”. In other words, there cannot be any disjunctive reading of the later portion of Section 2(h) and that it had to be read as one continuous whole. On this basis, it is argued that the appellant which may have been established by a law made by the Parliament is not a public authority, since it did not receive funds “directly or indirectly” from any appropriate Government.

4. In support of this argument, the learned counsel has relied upon various judgments laying down the principle of interpretation of statute and stressed that when the word “and” is incorporated instead of word “or” before the words “includes any”. It has to be read conjunctively, meaning thereby, disjunctive meaning should be permissible only if the word “or” was used by the Legislature. These judgments are:

(i) State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Puran Mal, (1985) 2 SCC 589;

(ii) Paras Ram Vs. State of Haryana, (1999) 5 SCC 662;

(iii) J. Jayalalitha Vs. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138;

(iv) The State of Bombay Vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699;

(v) Pooran Singh and Anr. Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1965 SC 1583;

(vi) Rajesh Kumar and Others Vs. Dy. CIT and Others, (2007) 2 SCC 181;

(vii) Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2004) 14 SCC 151;

(viii) The Star Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Calcutta (1970) 3 SCC 864

(ix) Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Product And Anthers Vs. UOI, (2000) 1 SCC 426.

5. Though there cannot be any dispute or quarrel about the proposition laid down upon the aforesaid judgments touching upon the interpretation of the words “and” “or”, we are afraid, insofar as present case is concerned on the plain reading of the provision, noth