2013 Supreme(Del) 1062
High Court of Delhi
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
St. Anthony’s Senior Secondary School
Versus
Rohini Gupta & Another
W.P.(C) No. 6549 of 2008
Decided on : 27-08-2013
For the Petitioner:P.P. Khurana, Sr. Adv. with Dipender Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondents:R1, Ms. Garima Prasad, Advocate.
The termination of a probationer's services does not require notice or an opportunity of hearing, and the termination order need not be stigmatic. Deemed confirmation of services must be specifically provided in the appointment letter.
Headnote:
Probation - Termination of Services - Delhi School Education Act, 1973 - Rule 105 - [Rule 105] - The court held that the probation period should not ordinarily extend beyond three years, and in exceptional cases, it may go up to five or six years. The termination of services of a probationer does not require notice or an opportunity of hearing. The termination order need not be stigmatic and can refer to unsatisfactory service without being considered stigmatic. The court also emphasized that there can be no deemed confirmation of services unless specifically provided in the appointment letter.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner-school terminated the services of the respondent no.1 during her probation period, citing unsatisfactory work. The respondent no.1 challenged the termination, claiming it to be stigmatic and malafide.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the termination order was non-stigmatic and not malafide. It held that the termination was justified based on the unsatisfactory performance of the respondent no.1 during her probation period.
Issues: The issues revolved around the stigmatic nature of the termination order, the unsatisfactory performance of the respondent no.1, and the alleged malafides of the petitioner-school.
Ratio Decidendi: The court established that the termination of a probationer's services does not require notice or an opportunity of hearing, and the termination order need not be stigmatic. It also emphasized that there can be no deemed confirmation of services unless specifically provided in the appointment letter.
Final Decision: The court set aside the order of the Delhi School Tribunal and held that there was no deemed confirmation of the respondent no.1. It also ruled that the termination of service of the respondent no.1 was non-stigmatic, not malafide, and pertained to unsatisfactory work.
Valmiki J. Mehta, J.
Oral:
1. By this writ petition, the petitioner-school impugns the order of the Delhi School Tribunal (DST) dated 30.7.2008. By the impugned order the Delhi School Tribunal allowed the appeal of the respondent no.1 and set aside her termination of services with full back wages. The Delhi School Tribunal has held that respondent no.1 will stand confirmed after initial period of probation. It has been held that her services could not have been extended after the first year of probation. The DST has held that extension of period of probation has to be within the first year of probation itself and not after three months of the expiry of the order of probation and in such circumstances, the employee is deemed to be confirmed after the first year of probation. The Delhi School Tribunal has buttressed its findings by observing that no memo was given to the respondent no.1 during her first period of probation to show unsatisfactory work.
2. I have recently held in the case of Hamdard Public School Vs. Directorate of Education & Anr. (W.P.(C) 8652/2011 decided on 25.07.2013) as under:
“3. Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 105 provides the original period of probation as one year, and which can be extended by the appointing authority. What is the period for which probation can be extended is however not provided in Sub-Rule1. Sub- Rule 1 further provides that services of an employee can be terminated without notice during the period of probation if the work and conduct of the employee is not satisfactory. First Proviso to the Sub-Rule 1 states that the requirement of the provision of Sub-Rule 1 of seeking approval of the Director of Education with regard to extension of period of probation by another year shall not apply in case of an employee of a minority school. The first proviso is therefore really limited for getting permission of the Director of Education for extension of the probation period “by another year”. It be noted that the expression is not “only another year” or “only another one year” or “a maximum period of another year” or “maximum period of another one year” etc. etc. The expression only uses “another year” without specifying an outer limit of the probation period. Also, even if in some manner of interpretation we take the expression “another year” to mean that there can only be one additional year of probation after the original one year of probation, even then, there is nothing found in the first proviso providing for automatic or deemed confirmation. As already stated above, first proviso only functions in a limited field qua getting permission of Director of Education. Neither the main body of Sub-Rule 1, nor the first proviso, provides for a maximum period of probation, and also they do not provide for automatic or deemed confirmation. The following conclusions therefore in my opinion can safely be drawn from reading of Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 105 alongwith its first Proviso.
(i) Sub-Rule 1 prescribes an initial probation period of one year, however, there is no maximum period of probation which is prescribed in this Sub-Rule.
(ii) Services of an employee can be terminated during the probation period (and which maximum probation period is not prescribed), if the work and conduct of the employee is not satisfactory.
(iii) Neither Sub-Rule 1 nor the first proviso provides for automatic or deemed confirmation on the expiry of the period of probation.
(iv) The first proviso only uses the expression “by another year” and not “by another one year” or “by another one year only” or “maximum by another year” i.e. in the first proviso there is no outer limit of probationary period prescribed like there is none in the body of the main Sub-Rule 1.
(v) The first proviso can in a way be said to only deal with a minority school not requiring permission of the Director of Education, and the same does not concern other schools in Delhi.
I must hasten to add that in terms of the judgments which have been passed by Divisio