The main legal point established in the judgment is that a plaint must disclose a cause of action for the reliefs sought, and failure to address issues raised by the opposing party can lead to rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit.

1. The above suit has been filed by Digamber Builders & Land Developers Private Limited against Mr. Inder Singh seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 11th February 2010 in respect of sale of half share of Khasra No. 308 (admeasuring 4 bighas and 16 biswas) and Khasra No. 309 (admeasuring 4 bighas and 16 biswas) in village Bhalaswa, Jehangirpur, Delhi. Alternatively, it is prayed that in the event specific performance cannot be granted, the Court should pass a decree for damages in the sum of Rs.80 lakhs along with pendente lite and future interest @ 24 % per annum. A third prayer is for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant from alienating the suit property.

2. While directing issuance of summons in the suit on 30th May 2012, this Court restrained the Defendant from creating third party interests in regard to the undivided share in the suit property.

3. Thereafter, the Defendant filed IA No. 14302 of 2012 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and IA No. 14303 of 2012 under Order VI Rule 4 and under Order XI Rules 12 and 14 CPC for furnishing better particulars. In the latter application, the Defendant pointed out that in para 17 of the plaint it had been mentioned that the Defendant had failed to perform his obligations under the agreement to sell dated 11th February 2009 and that no such document was produced with the plaint. Further it was pointed out that in para 6 of the plaint, a reference had been made to the fact that the balance sale consideration was payable by 11th February 2011 whereas there was no document to that effect. Accordingly, it was prayed in the application that the Plaintiff should be ordered to furnish better particulars in respect of the agreement to sell dated 11th February 2010 as mentioned in para 6 of the plaint as well as the agreement to sell dated 11th February 2009 referred to in para 17 of the plaint.

4. IA No. 14303 of 2012 was listed before the Court on 7th August 2012 and the following order was passed therein:

“The learned counsel for the Plaintiff states that in fact correct date of agreement is 11th February 2010 and the date has been wrongly typed as 11th February 2009 in para 17 of the plaint.

In view of this clarification, no further order needs to be passed. The application stands disposed of.”

5. It must be noted at this stage that the entire plaint is based on the agreement to sell dated 11th February 2010. Originally, along with the plaint, the photocopy of the said agreement and receipt of the same date purportedly executed by the Defendant were produced. It appears that on 29th May 2012, even prior to the above order being passed by the Court, the original of the agreement to sell as well as the receipt was filed. Both are typed documents. While the agreement to sell is on a Rs. 50 stamp paper, the receipt has a revenue stamp with the purported signature of the Defendant thereon. Interestingly both documents, have during admission/denial of documents, been denied by the Defendant.

6. It is the case of the Defendant that his signatures were forcibly obtained on the said documents and that in fact he never received the amount of Rs.20 lakhs which, according to the said receipt, he is supposed to have received. The case of the Defendant is that “the Plaintiff has procured and manipulated the agreement to sell dated 11th February 2010 and receipt dated 11th February 2010 to deceive the Defendant and to get the undue benefit fraudulently and under undue influence and coercion”.

7. In IA No. 14302 of 2012, under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, numerous grounds have been raised by the Defendant seeking rejection of the plaint. It is contended, inter alia, that the agreement to sell was mandatorily required to be registered but was not; that it was required to be duly stamped but was not and, therefore, was inadmissible; that it was barred under Section 3 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954; that it was barred by Sections 10, 14(a), 15(a) and 16 of t