2013 Supreme(Del) 377
DELHI HIGH COURT
MANMOHAN, J.
Pearl Retail Solutions Pvt. Ltd
vs
Pearl Education Society
CS (OS) No. 117 of 2013
Decided On: 08/04/2013
Headnote:
PEARL - Trademark Dispute - Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 17, Section 28 - The court discussed the interpretation of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically focusing on the exclusivity of the word 'PEARL' as a trademark in the context of education and training services. The court emphasized the proprietary rights of the plaintiff in the word 'PEARL' based on registrations and non-disclaimer, and dismissed the defendant's application for vacation of the interim order.
Fact of the Case:
The defendant filed an application for vacation of an interim order restraining the use of the word 'PEARL' in relation to its services. The defendant argued that 'PEARL' is a generic word and the plaintiff did not have exclusive rights over it. The plaintiff claimed exclusive rights based on registrations and non-disclaimer of the word 'PEARL'.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the word 'PEARL' was not generic in the context of education and training services, and the plaintiff had exclusive proprietary rights based on registrations and non-disclaimer. The court dismissed the defendant's application for vacation of the interim order.
Issues: The issues revolved around the exclusivity of the word 'PEARL' as a trademark in the context of education and training services, the interpretation of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the defendant's argument regarding the generic nature of the word.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically Section 17 and Section 28, and the determination of the exclusivity of the word 'PEARL' as a trademark in the context of education and training services.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the defendant's application for vacation of the interim order and confirmed the interim order restraining the use of the word 'PEARL'. The defendant was directed to change or amend its corporate name and/or name of its educational institutes by deleting the mark 'PEARL'.
MANMOHAN, J.
1. Present application has been filed by the defendant under Order 39, Rule 4 read with Section 151 CPC for vacation of the interim order dated 23rd January, 2013. It is pertinent to mention that this Court vide order dated 23rd January, 2013 had restrained the defendant, its proprietor/partner, representatives, dealers, servants, assignees and successors from using the word PEARL or any trade mark deceptively similar to the plaintiffs trade mark PEARL in relation to its services as part of its corporate name and/or in the name of any educational institute/s or in any other manner whatsoever.
2. Mr. Ravi Gupta, learned senior counsel for the applicant/defendant submits that the plaintiff does not have exclusive right over the word PEARL. He points out that the word PEARL has been registered in favour of nine other entities under Class 41 and in each class several people have been granted the stand alone mark PEARL. He states that the stand alone mark PEARL has been registered in favour of Sharda Birla under Class 24. He submits that the word PEARL is a generic word. In support of his submissions, Mr. Gupta relies upon the following Supreme Courts judgment in Skyline Education Institute (Pvt.) Ltd. v. S. L. Vaswani & Anr., AIR 2010 SC 3221 wherein it has been held as under:-
17. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether the impugned order is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record or refusal of the High Court to grant injunction in terms of the prayer made by the appellant has resulted in manifest injustice. A little journey into the backdrop of the case shows that the only ground on which the appellant sought temporary injunction against the respondents was that the word Skyline is a specific/distinct word and being a prior user, it was entitled to seek a restraint against the respondents from using that word in the name of Institute of Engineering and Technology established by them. The learned single Judge, after examining the rival pleadings and material placed before him recorded a well-reasoned finding that the appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case. The learned single Judge opined that the word Skyline is a generic word because the same is being used by thousands of persons and institutions as part of their trading name or business activities. The learned single Judge noted that while the plaintiff is neither approved by AICTE nor affiliated with any university, the respondents have obtained the requisite recognition and affiliation from the statutory bodies concerned and 240 students have already been admitted in the five-year course and held that grant of injunction in terms of the prayer made by the appellant will be inequitable. The Division Bench independently considered the entire matter and expressed its agreement with the learned single Judge that the appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of injunction. The Division Bench also agreed with the learned single Judge that the word Skyline was a generic word because it was being used by a large number of people in India and abroad. The Division Bench then held that after recording adverse findings on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience and equity, the learned single Judge was not justified in directing the respondents not to undertake courses in Management, Tour and Travels, etc. and append a note in the advertisements that their Institute has no concern, whatsoever with the appellants Institution. Accordingly, the Division Bench substantially vacated the modified injunction order passed by the learned single Judge.
18. In our opinion, the findings recorded by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench on the crucial factors like prima facie case, balance of convenience and equity are based on a correct and balanced consideration of various facets of the case and it is not possible to find any fault with the conclusions recorded by them that it is not