The central legal point established in the judgment is the mandatory consideration of the Domestic Incident Report under Section 12 of the DV Act and the requirement for fair and reasonable procedure in deciding applications under the Act.

1. In the above-captioned first two petitions, quashing of impugned order of 23rd August, 2008 is sought by both the sides. In a complaint under Section 12 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the DV Act), trial court vide impugned order of 23rd June, 2008 has directed husband-Ravi Dutta to pay maintenance of Rupees Twenty Thousand per month to wife- Kiran Dutta and another Rupees Twenty Thousand per month towards rental and another Rupees Twenty Thousand as compensation under Section 22 of the DV Act. In appeal, impugned order has been set aside and the matter has been remanded back to trial court with following directions:-

(i) First of all, learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall determine as to whether the petitioner is an aggrieved person within the definition of Section 2(a) of the Act.

(ii) Thereafter, he shall call for a Domestic Incident Report from the Protection Officer or Service Provider.

(iii) It would always be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct both the parties to undergo counselling with a member of service provider as per Section 14 of the Act.

(iv) It would be also appropriate for the Magistrate to send both the parties for mediation.

(v) In the meantime, the Magistrate may award an interim maintenance or protection as the case may be to the aggrieved person during these proceedings.

(vi) Metropolitan Magistrate would be fully justified in deciding the case only on the basis of averments, affidavits and documents filed by the parties. He need not convert this family litigation in a full-fledged trial. However, in the present case, learned Metropolitan Magistrate will give an opportunity to Ms. Kiran Dutta to file an affidavit explaining the obscene SMSs, her medical treatment and other averments made by appellant in his reply before learned Metropolitan Magistrate.

2. Not satisfied with impugned order of 23rd August, 2008, both the sides have challenged it in the above captioned two petitions on different grounds. In the above captioned third petition, cancellation of bail granted to petitioner-husband vide order of 2nd May, 2008 in FIR No. 63/2007 under Sections 406/498/34 of IPC, registered at Police Station Amar Colony, New Delhi by complainant-wife is sought.

3. With the consent of learned counsel for parties, the above captioned three petitions were heard together and by this common judgment, they are being disposed of.

4. At the hearing, it was urged on behalf of petitioner-husband that impugned order rightly sets aside trial court’s order but there is no basis for remanding the matter back to trial court and in fact, complainant – wife’s application under Section 12 of D.V. Act ought to have been dismissed, as complainant–wife is a highly qualified lady, who has been paid Rs.5.40 lacs annually and that there is no finding of any domestic violence being committed by petitioner-husband. It was submitted on behalf of petitioner-husband that grant of interim maintenance of Rupees Ten Thousand per month is wholly justified without returning a prima facie finding of petitioner-husband being guilty of committing domestic violence. To contend so, reliance was placed by learned counsel for petitioners upon decisions in Renu Mittal v. Anil Mittal, 173 (2010) DLT 269; Rachna Kathuria v. Ramesh Kathuria, 173 (2010) DLT 289; Vijay Verma v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2010 (118) DRJ 520; Sanjay Bhardwaj & Ors. v. State & Anr., 2010 (118) DRJ 385; Damanpreet Kaur v. Indermeet Juneja, (2013) 1 JCC 306; Smt. Mamta Jaiswal v. Rajesh Jaiswal II (2000) DMC 170.

5. On behalf of complainant-wife it was submitted that appellate court in the impugned order has set aside well reasoned order of trial court without any valid justification and so impugned order deserves to be set aside and trial court’s order ought to be restored.

6. After having heard both the sides and on perusal of the impugned order, trial court order and the decisions cited, I find that Section 12 of D