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2014 Supreme(Del) 707

High Court of Delhi
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
Satyapal
Versus
Slick Auto Accessories Pvt. Ltd. & Others
RSA No. 40 of 2013 & CM. No. 3203 of 2013 (stay)
Decided On : 05-03-2014

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant:Deepak Tyagi, Advocate.
For the Respondents:T.K. Mukherjee, Advocate.

The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of territorial jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC and the principles that the debtor has to seek the creditor and that the contract was entered at Delhi.

Headnote:

Territorial Jurisdiction - Civil Procedure Code - Section 100 CPC - Summary Judgment - Delhi Courts - 177 (2011) DLT 789, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 634, AIR 1954 SC 340 - The first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court by holding that the courts at Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction. The trial court held that the courts at Delhi had territorial jurisdiction because the payment was to be made in Delhi and the contract was entered at Delhi. The first appellate court's findings were set aside as it did not refer to the analysis and reasoning of the trial court for holding that the courts at Delhi have jurisdiction.

Fact of the Case:

The second appeal challenges the first appellate court's judgment setting aside the trial court's judgment and decree for an amount of Rs. 98,880/- along with interest. The substantial question of law framed is whether the first appellate court's judgment holding that the courts at Delhi have no jurisdiction is perverse.

Finding of the Court:

The trial court held that the courts at Delhi had territorial jurisdiction due to the payment being made in Delhi and the contract being entered at Delhi. The first appellate court set aside this judgment, but its findings were set aside as it did not refer to the analysis and reasoning of the trial court for holding that the courts at Delhi have jurisdiction.

Issues: The main issue was whether the courts at Delhi had territorial jurisdiction. The trial court held that they did, while the first appellate court set aside this judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: The trial court's decision was based on the principles that the debtor has to seek the creditor and that the contract was entered at Delhi. The first appellate court's decision was set aside as it did not refer to the trial court's analysis and reasoning for holding that the courts at Delhi have jurisdiction.

Final Decision: The regular second appeal is allowed, and the trial court's judgment is restored. The trial court's thorough and analytical judgment was upheld, and the first appellate court's findings were set aside.

Judgment

Valmiki J. Mehta, J.

1. This second appeal is filed under Section 100 CPC impugning the judgment of the first appellate court dated 25.10.2012 by which the first appellate court has accepted the appeal filed by the defendants and set aside the judgment and decree dated 30.01.2012 passed by the trial court for an amount of Rs. 98,880/- along with interest @ 18% per annum on the amount of Rs. 32,960/- w.e.f 7.7.2007 and on Rs. 65,920/- w.e.f 16.7.2007 i.e. interest has been granted from the date of the bills. Pendente lite and future interest is awarded @ 12% per annum simple. Suit has been decreed for goods which were supplied by the appellant/plaintiff to the respondent no. 1 herein/defendant no.1.

2. For the disposal of this regular second appeal, the following substantial question of law is framed:

“Whether the judgment of the first appellate court holding that the courts at Delhi have no jurisdiction is totally perverse because it ignores the detailed, exhaustive and analytical conclusion arrived at by the trial court while dealing with the Issue no. 1 pertaining to territorial jurisdiction?”

3. The first appellate court by the impugned judgment has set aside the judgment of the trial court by holding that the courts at Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction because goods were supplied to respondent no.1/buyer at Bhiwadi in Rajasthan. The relevant observations of the first appellate court holding that the courts at Delhi have no territorial jurisdiction read as under:

“Now the question is that whether the case of action has partly arisen in Delhi or not. The case of the respondent is that the goods were supplied from Delhi, therefore the cause of action has partly arisen in Delhi. The respondent has examined his son as PW-2 in the Trial Court who has stated that goods were delivered from the factory of the respondent to the authorized person of the appellants.

The perusal of the Trial Court Record shows that evidence of PW-2 is beyond the pleadings and the same cannot be read in evidence.

As per the pleadings, the good were supplied at Bhiwadi, in Rajasthan. The perusal of pleadings does not indicate that any part of cause o action accrued in favour of the plaintiff in Delhi.

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in a case, reported as 177 (2011) DLT 789 was held that, a part of cause of action accrues at a place where the contract is executed. Each and every fact pleaded in the plaint does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts constitute cause of action vesting territorial jurisdiction with a Court to adjudicate upon a case. The expression “cause of action” consists of bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove in order to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Whether any part of cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of the a Court, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the given case.

It was further held in 177 (2011) DLT 789 (Supra) that, it is settled principle of law that by a contract or an agreement parties, cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court of otherwise does not have or where no part of cause of action has accrued in favour of the party claiming enforcement its claim.

It was further held in 177 (2011) DLT 789 (Supra) that, the place where the plaintiff is carrying on its business or from where he is sending his legal notice is not relevant and is of no consequence as it does not constitute any cause of action within the meaning of Section 20 (c), CPC.

It was further held in 177 (2011) DLT 789 (Supra) that, pleading are required to specifically contain all necessary details which are to the substantiated by way of evidence during trail. If the pleadings are silent on a particular material facts, a party cannot be allowed to proved the same later on by adducing evidence.

Therefore, in view of 177 (2011) DLT 789 (Supra) it is clear that no part of cause of action arose in Delhi.

It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported as AIR 196
















































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