The court emphasized the importance of diligently pursuing matters and upheld the purpose of the specific period of limitation in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Manmohan Singh, J.

1. The abovementioned objection petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short, called the “Act”) against the Award dated 24th February, 2011 passed by the sole Arbitrator Mr. B.L. Chaudhary.

2. Along with the petition, the petitioner has filed an application under Section 151 CPC for condonation of delay of 112 days in re-filing the petition after deduction of 30 days. The said application was dismissed by order dated 6th March, 2013. Consequently, the main petition under Section 34 of the Act was also dismissed. The said order was challenged in appeal by the petitioner, being FAO (OS) No.230/2013, which was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court on 8th November, 2013 and the application for condonation of delay was remanded back to be re-heard in view of following orders :

“4. In the present case, we find that learned Single Judge has not returned a finding as to whether there was sufficient cause to explain the delay in re-filing the petition. This is so because of the view taken by the learned Single Judge, in law. Now, when the position has been clarified in our decision in Durga Construction (supra), we feel that the matter be remanded to the learned Single Judge for returning a finding and for considering as to whether the application for condoning the delay, in re-filing the petition under Section 34, on the part of the appellant deserves to be condoned or not. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Single Judge to decide the IA No. 16577/2011 on merits.”

3. While remanding back the present application, being I.A. No.16577/2011, the Division Bench has referred a judgment in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. M/s. Durga Construction Co., FAO (OSS) 485-86/2011 delivered by it on 7th November, 2013. Paras 19 and 20 of the said judgment read as under:

“19. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Company: (2001) 8 SCC 470 has held that the time limit prescribed under section 34 of the Act to challenge an award is not extendable by the Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in view of the express language of section 34(3) of the Act. However, this decision would not be applicable in cases where the application under section 34 of the Act has been filed within the extended time prescribed, and there is a delay in re-presentation of the application after curing the defects that may have been pointed out. This is so because section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be applicable in such cases. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for extension of the period of limitation in certain cases where the Court is satisfied that the appellant/applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or making an application within the specified period. In cases, where the application/appeal is filed in time, section 5 would have no application. The Supreme Court in the case of Indian Statistical Institute v. Associated Builders: (1978) 1 SCC 483 considered the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 where the objection to an award under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was filed in time but there was substantial delay in re-filing the same. The High Court in that case held that there was a delay in filing the objections for setting aside the award and consequently, rejected the application for condonation of delay. An appeal against the decision of the High Court was allowed and the Supreme Court rejected the contention that there was any delay in filing objections for setting aside the award. The relevant extract from the decision of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:-

"9. ..... In the circumstances, it cannot be said that objections were not filed within time or that because they were not properly stamped the objections could not be taken as having been filed at all. Therefore, in our