The main legal point established in the judgment is that the arbitral tribunal, under Section 19 of the Act, has the power to regulate its own procedure for the production of documents, and is not bound by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act.

Vipin Sanghi, J.

1. This petition has been preferred under Section 27 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act) to seek necessary orders and directions to direct the respondent to produce the two documents, the details whereof are as follows:

i) Communication dated 22.06.2005 allegedly sent by the respondent to the petitioner containing summary of delays with the civil contractor along with its proof of delivery; and

ii) Reply of the respondent submitted to its Vigilance Department to the queries issued by the respondent’s Vigilance Department.

2. The parties to this petition are before an arbitral tribunal in respect of the disputes which have arisen between them in relation to the contract dated 14.02.2003 i.e. the Service Provider Agreement (SPA). The petitioner is the claimant in the arbitral proceedings, and is claiming its service charges from the respondent.

3. It appears that the petitioner moved an application to seek discovery and production of several documents from the respondent. By order dated 20.07.2013, the arbitral tribunal - consisting of three learned arbitrators, has held that the aforesaid two documents are relevant evidence in the matter. The tribunal has expressed the opinion that the disclosure of the said documents is necessary for giving the claimant full opportunity to present its case and that the said documents appear to be, prima facie, relevant.

4. The arbitral tribunal has observed that it is passing the order “by way of applying to the Hon’ble Delhi High Court for its assistance in the production of the said documents”. Liberty was given to the petitioner to place the said order passed by the arbitral tribunal before the Registrar General of this court.

5. Upon issuance of notice, the respondents have filed their reply. At the outset, the Court put a question to learned counsel for the petitioner to satisfy the Court as to how the present petition is maintainable, since the arbitral tribunal has only found that the documents – of which the petitioner claimant has sought production, are relevant, and no witness is required to be summoned with, or without, any evidence. The tribunal has not passed an order directing production of the said documents by the respondent.

6. On this, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the court to the earlier part of the tribunal’s order dated 20.07.2013.

7. From the tribunal’s order, it appears that the respondents had argued before the arbitral tribunal that it is not a court; its orders are not judicial orders; its functions are not judicial functions; it cannot exercise its powers ex debito justitiae, and; that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal being within the four corners of the agreement, it can only pass such an order which may be the subject matter of reference. An arbitral tribunal does not have inherent powers like a court. It is a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and its jurisdiction is circumscribed by the terms of reference.

8. The jurisdiction of the tribunal to itself pass an order directing discovery and production of documents was challenged by the respondent. In this regard, reliance was placed by the respondent on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, Army Welfare Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd., (2004) 9 SCC 619.

9. Before the arbitral tribunal, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the arbitral tribunal could direct production of documents by the respondent on its own. The submission of the petitioner was that:

“even after enactment of Section 27, an Arbitral Tribunal under A&C Act 1996 can direct production of evidence which it considers relevant despite the objection raised by the other party, as otherwise, the Arbitral Tribunal will be denied of a very vital power of conducting the arbitration proceedings. If the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, the same will delay the conclusion of the arbitration