The main legal point established is that the deeming provision of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act triggers when the award has been made more than five years prior to the commencement of the new act, and either physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid.

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. Originally this petition was filed challenging the notice dated 07.01.2010 issued under the signatures of respondent No. 2 purportedly under Section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1894 Act’). The petition was also directed against the order dated 03.04.2010 passed by respondent No. 2. It is pertinent to note that earlier an Award No. 2193 dated 13.01.1969 had been made by the Land Acquisition Collector in respect of, inter alia, the petitioner’s land in Khasra No. 1103/283 (Min) comprising of 66.66 sq. yards in village Jhilmil Tahirpur.

2. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2013 Act’) came into effect on 01.01.2014. The petitioner, feeling that it was entitled to the benefit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, moved an application being CM No. 3088 of 2014 stating that the award in respect of the subject land had been passed more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It was further stated that the possession of the said land continued to be with the petitioner and that the compensation had also not been paid. Consequently, it was submitted on the basis of these submissions that the acquisition in respect of which the award dated 13.01.1969 had been made be declared as having lapsed in view of the deeming provision of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Mr. Sethi, the learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that all the ingredients of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court and this court in the following decisions stand satisfied:-

(1) Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors: (2014) 3 SCC 183;

(2) Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC 564;

(3) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014;

(4) Surender Singh v. Union of India & Others: WP(C) 2294/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this Court;

(5) Jagjit Singh and Ors v. Union of India and Ors: W.P.(C) Nos. 2806/2004, 2807-2934/2004 decided by this court on 27.05.2014; and

(6) Gyanender Singh & Ors v. Union Of India & Ors: WP(C) 1393/2014 decided by this court on 23.09.2014.

3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submitted that the possession of the subject land was not taken because of the subsistence of the interim orders passed by this court. He further submitted that the petitioner had not come forward to receive the compensation as she had filed the present petition and had obtained interim orders. He further submitted that in any event, compensation had been deposited in the competent court after obtaining directions from this court in CM (Main) No. 1406/2013 tilted Union of India v. ADJ, Shahdra by virtue of the order dated 30.12.2013 passed by a Vacation Judge of this court.

4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents further submitted that the writ petition ought to be thrown out on the ground that it has been filed on behalf of a subsequent purchaser. The learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had purchased a land after the issuance of the notifications under section 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act. He also submitted that it is settled law that a subsequent purchaser has no right to challenge the acquisition proceeding and has only a limited right to receive compensation. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of KN Aswathnarayana Setty (D) Tr. LRs.& Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. AIR 2014 SC 279. According to the learned counsel, the Supreme Court held that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance of a notification for acquisition is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever. He contended that the sale deed executed in f