The judgment of the civil court on the ownership of the property prevails under Section 50 of the DRC Act, and the withdrawal of the appeal against the civil court judgment led to the dismissal of the eviction petition.

Valmiki j. Mehta, j (oral):

1. This rent control revision petition is filed under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short ‘the DRC Act’) impugning the judgment of the of the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) dated 4.6.2011 which has dismissed the leave to defend application filed by the petitioners/tenants and has decreed the bonafide necessity eviction petition filed by the respondent/landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act with respect to the tenanted premises being two rooms, store, kitchen, bathroom, W.C on the ground floor together with one mezzanine room between ground and first floor above the garage of the property bearing no. D95, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-110007.

2. The facts of the case are a bit curious to say the least inasmuch as, respondent/landlord claims to be the owner on the ground that he was a servant working with the owner namely one Mr. Dayal Dass Talwar and his daughter-in-law Smt. Vidyawati and that the respondent became the owner of the suit property by virtue of a registered Will dated 17.3.1988 executed by Smt. Vidyawati who had become the owner of the suit property after the death of her father-in-law Sh. Dayal Dass Talwar. Respondent/landlord claims that tenants originally were Sh. Roop Lal Sehgal and his wife Smt. Kailash Wati and the present petitioners are the legal heirs of Sh. Roop Lal Sehgal and Smt. Kailash Wati. The bonafide necessity eviction petition was filed claiming that the tenanted premises are required for the bonafide residential need of the respondent and his family members.

3. A reading of the impugned judgment shows that the same is cryptic to say the least because there is lack of adequate discussion in the judgment with respect to the family members of the respondent, the accommodation already available and consequent bonafide need and more importantly as to how the respondent has been held to be the owner of the premises. The only effective discussion with respect to ownership of the respondent is given in para 10 of the impugned judgment and the same reads as under:-

“10. The first ground taken on behalf of the respondent for grant of leave to defend is that petitioner is not owner of the suit property and only a rent collector. For deciding application under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act the first question for determination is whether there exists a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and not the question of ownership. The use of the word owner in clause (e) of the proviso of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act seems to have been inspired by the definition of the word landlord as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Construed in the context in which the word owner is used in clause (e), the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent Control Law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. An owner under section 14(1)(e) need not be an absolute owner requiring registered sale deed in his favour contemplated by the general law in section 54 of Transfer of Property Act. A restricted meaning cannot be given to owner for purposes of the Act. The meaning of the word owner vis-a-vis the tenant is that the owner should be something more than the tenant. In the present case, it is admitted by the respondent that he has been paying rent to the applicant and the applicant has been collecting the rent from the respondent which establishes a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.”

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners/tenants has vehemently contended that the Additional Rent Controller has wrongly held that the petitioners/tenants have admitted payment of rent to the respondent. More importantly petitioners rely upon the judgment of the civil court dated 16.3.2011 being the judgment passed by Ms. Aanchal, C