Sanjeev Sachdeva, J.

1. The controversy as of now that has arisen is whether from the impugned order an intra court appeal would lie under section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) or not?

2. The impugned order is not an order from which an appeal is specifically provided either under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) or under any other special law.

3. An objection was raised by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the appeal under section 10 of the Act and it was contended that assuming though not admitting, even if the impugned order satisfies the test as laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8, in other words, it affects vital and valuable rights of the parties and decides matters of moment and thus an appeal would lie from the order of the learned Single Judge, the appeal in its present form would not be maintainable.

4. The parties were heard on this limited question and the present order is being passed deciding the issue of maintainability of the appeal in its present form. The examination is limited to the maintainability of the appeal under section 10 of the Act and we are not examining whether an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent would be maintainable or not.

5. Normally, where an intra court appeal is maintainable, the form would not be very relevant, however, in the context of the Delhi High Court, it has relevance, because as per the division of rosters, appeals under section 10 of the Act and appeals under clause 10 of the Letters Patent are to be heard by different benches.

6. The controversy as to which are the orders from which an intra court appeal would lie under section 10 of the Act and which are the orders from which an appeal would lie under clause 10 of the Letters Patent has been put to rest by the judgment of a full bench of this court in Jaswinder Singh & another v. Mrigendra Pritam Vikramsingh Steiner & others, 196 (2013) DLT 1 (FB). The Full Bench has laid down that, in respect of an order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction in case of a non-appealable order under section 104 read with Order 43 of the said Code which meets the test of a “judgment” and which decides matters of moment or affects vital and valuable rights of parties and which works serious injustice to the parties concerned as per the parameters laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji case (supra) by the Supreme Court, an appeal to the Division Bench would exclusively lie under section 10 of the said Act and not under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

7. To ascertain as to whether an order falls in one category or the other, it is necessary to examine as to in exercise of which jurisdiction, the order has been passed. This becomes relevant in view of the history of the court system in India. The same has been very succinctly dealt with by the Full Bench in Jaswinder Singh case (supra). For the purposes of resolution of the controversy that has arisen, it would be appropriate to briefly refer to the evolution of the system of courts in India.

8. There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of the courts that were established in the presidency towns during the British era and those that were situated outside those areas. Further, distinction has occurred on account of what are called Chartered High Courts and Non-Chartered High Courts.

9. A brief summary of the history as enunciated in Jaswinder Singh case (supra) shows that the East India Company, was established by the Charter of Queen Elizabeth I in 1600. Though the Company was established for purposes of trading only, it was also empowered to make laws for the good governance of the Company, its employees, officers, etc., and for the better advancement and continuance of trading and to impose punishments and fines in enforcement of those laws.

10. As the East India Company established factories and acq