The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of an individual's classification as a 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, based on the nature of duties performed and the terms of the employment agreement.

DEEPA SHARMA, J.

1. Vide the present writ petition, the petitioner-workman has challenged the award dated 23.04.2001, whereby the learned Labour Court has held that the petitioner is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ID Act’), hence not entitled to any relief.

2. The petitioner had set out a case before the Labour Court, wherein in his Statement of Claim he had alleged that he was employed with the Management since 01.06.1983 and from the very beginning, he had been working as full time Grainer, yet in the appointment letter he was shown as a trainee. He had further claimed that at the time of his appointment with the Management, he had produced experience certificates of various other establishments where he was employed earlier and since he had already taken the training before he joined the Management, the question of his taking the training from the Management did not arise. It is also claimed that the Management as per his practice used to show its regular employees as trainees. His claim was that he could not report for his duty from 11.06.1986 to 17.06.1986 due to his illness and on his return to duty on 18.06.1986, he was not allowed to resume. According to him, his services were illegally terminated on 18.06.1986.

3. The case of the Management before the Labour Court was that the workman was working as a trainee with the Management. At the time of joining the Management he had not produced any experience certificates. He was issued appointment letter of a trainee only and his training was extended from time to time. He was paid honorarium only. It is further alleged that it was the claimant who had been absent from duty since 09.06.1986.

4. On these pleas of the parties, the Labour Court adjudicated the matter and after recording the evidences had returned its findings. The Labour Court has found that the letter Ex.P-2 proved on record by the workman was his appointment letter bearing his signatures and the workman was engaged by the Management as a Grainer and that he had been working in the said capacity with the Management. The appointment letter further indicated that stipend of Rs.400/- was payable to the claimant and period of training also could be extended from time to time and in case the claimant would absent himself from training without prior information, he would be deemed to have voluntarily abandoned his training. Relying on the findings in the case of Kamal Kumar vs. J.P.S. Malik, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1998 LLR 628, the Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the claimant was not a workman within the meaning of the ID Act.

5. The said findings have been assailed before this Court on the ground that the petitioner, in fact, was a full time Grainer and worked with the respondent for more than three years without any absence and that the petitioner was not aware about the fact that in his appointment letter, he had been shown as a trainee. It is further contended that the workman was not covered under the provisions of Apprentices Act and, therefore, he was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act which also includes the apprentice. It is further contended that the petitioner was getting his dearness allowance from the Management which itself shows the status of the petitioner as a workman, as only the regular workers has a right to get these allowances. Copy of the alleged dearness allowance receipts are also placed with the writ petition. It is further contended that it was obligatory on the part of the Labour Court to find the type of work done by the petitioner and record a finding in this connection. On these contentions, it is prayed that the award be set aside and the petitioner be ordered to be reinstated with back wages and continuity in service.

6. In the present case, arguments have been addressed by the counsels for both the parties and written synopses with supporting case laws