Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. (Oral):--

1. In this writ petition, the petitioner seeks a declaration that the acquisition proceedings has lapsed in view of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the new Act”).

2. The award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been made on 19.09.1986. It is, therefore, clear that the award was made more than five years prior to the commencement of the new Act which took effect from 01.01.2014. It is also an admitted position that the possession has not been taken and compensation has also not been paid. Since all the conditions necessary for invoking Section 24(2) stand satisfied in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki and Ors, (2014) 3 SCC 183, the petitioner claims that the acquisition has lapsed.

3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that although the award had been made more than five years prior to the commencement of the new Act and that it was also a fact that compensation has not been paid nor has the possession been taken, the petitioner would still not be entitled to the benefits of the deeming provisions of Section 24(2) of the new Act. It was contended that this would be so because the respondents could not take possession on account of interim orders passed by the court. Furthermore, because possession could not be taken on account of interim orders even compensation has not been paid. It was then contended that because of the court order, the possession could not have been taken nor the compensation could be paid and the respondents should not be put to a disadvantage because of an act of court.

4. A similar argument was raised in a batch of matters which had come up before us in Jagjit Singh and Ors v. Union of India and Ors: W.P.(C) Nos. 2806/2004, 2807-2934/2004 and other connected matters. In our judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra) delivered on 27.05.2014, we had observed as under:-

“9. We have already set out section 24 of the new Act in its entirety. It is evident that section 24(2) of the new Act is a nonobstante provision. The conditions which are required to be satisfied before the deeming provision is triggered are:-

(i) The award should have been made under section 11 of the old Act, more than five years prior to the commencement of the new act; and

(ii) Physical possession of the land in question should not have been taken; or

(iii) The compensation should not have been paid.

These conditions are unqualified. It does not matter as to what was the reason behind the non-payment of compensation or for not taking possession. If the legislature wanted to qualify the above conditions by excluding the period during which the proceedings of acquisition of land were held up on account of stay or injunction by way of an order of a Court, it could have been expressly spelt out. In fact, whenever the legislature thought that it was necessary to spell out such an intention, it did. An example of this is to be found in the first proviso to section 19 (7) of the new Act which is as under:-

“19(7)……..Provided that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded.”

10. Furthermore, it would be instructive to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandurang Vinayak (supra) which has been relied upon by Mr Sethi, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. In that decision the purpose and meaning of a statutory fiction was being considered. While doing so, the Supreme Court referred to an English decision in the case of East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1952) A.C. 109 and in particular to an observat

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