The limitations of the principal employer's duties towards contracted employees under the Contract Labour Act and the right of contract labourers to continue working for the principal employer after the contract ends.

DEEPA SHARMA, J.

1. The petitioners case is that Lady Hardinge Medical College/respondent no. 3 and M/s. M.S. Vigilant Security/respondent no. 4 had entered into the agreement dated 15.07.2009 for providing Security Guards to respondent no. 3. The petitioners have been working as security guards pursuant to the said agreement and they have been continuously discharging their duties since 2009. They have been regularly paid their wages in time but from the last two years, there was interruption/delay in payment of wages but despite that they continued to work for respondent no. 3. Respondent no. 4, the Contractor had not paid them the wages. The wages were also not paid by respondent no. 3, the principal employee.

2. Thereafter, the union on behalf of petitioners filed a complaint before respondent no. 2 demanding the payment of the wages. The conciliatory efforts made by respondent no. 2 however failed. The respondent No. 3 had avoided the payment to the petitioners and now the respondent no. 3 had decided to engage another Contractor in place of Respondent no. 4. Their contract was extended upto 31.05.2015 and thereafter it was further extended upto 31.05.2015 and all the petitioners were asked to make their own arrangement.

3. It is submitted that the responsibility to pay the wages under Section 21 of The Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 is that of contractors. However, the principal employer is duty bound to appoint authorised representative to oversee the disbursement of the wages and on failure of the contractor to pay the wages, the liability shifts upon the principal employer to pay the wages. It is submitted that if the contract is terminated and they become unemployed, it would be difficult for them to recover their wages. It is also contended that the Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 has held that principal employer should give preference to the contract labour in case the principal employer intends to employ regular employee in place of contract labour by giving relaxation in age etc. On these facts, it is prayed that respondent no. 3 be directed not to replace petitioners by a fresh contract labours without giving them the right of consideration in respect of their employment in the establishment and make the payment of wages to the petitioners which is due since 1st November, 2014.

4. Arguments have been heard in the present case.

5. From the contentions itself, it is apparent that the contract between respondent no. 3 and contractor/respondent no. 4 had been expiring by efflux of time w.e.f. 31.05.2015. The petitioners are Contractor’s employee working for respondent no. 3 under the said contract. The respondent no. 3 is replacing these contract employees/the petitioners only by way of tendering the work by way of fresh contract. There is no contention that the respondent no. 3 is in the process of employing regular employees in place of the contract workers. Hence, the principles laid down in Steel Authority of India (supra), is not applicable to the facts of this case. The respondent No. 3 has every right to outsource the work under fresh Contract.

6. The petitioners have also relied to the findings of the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Panda & Others vs. Steel Authority of India and Others, (1994) 5 SCC 304 to substantiate their claim that they are entitled to continue to work for respondent no. 3. I have given careful considerations to the findings in the case of R.K. Panda (supra).

7. In the R.K. Panda case (supra), the contract workers claimed parity in pay with regular employees and also regularisation in the employment of the said authority on the ground that they had been in the employment for the period ranging from 10 to 20 years and allegedly been treated as contract labourers only for defeating their claims. In the present case, there is no contention that the Contract was sham or the respond