The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for the Public Prosecutor to independently apply their mind in deciding to withdraw from prosecution and the need for judicial scrutiny to ensure the withdrawal is not improperly exercised or for illegitimate purposes.

1. Whether an application for withdrawal from prosecution can be withdrawn at any time at the sweet will of Public Prosecutor, is the question raised in the above-captioned three petitions.

2. Petitioner is an accused in three FIRs i.e. FIR No.90/2000; FIR No.99/2002 and FIR No.148/2002, registered for the offences of cheating, etc., in which the State through the Public Prosecutor had filed applications under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. for withdrawal from the prosecution. These applications were filed on 24th November, 2011 and then abruptly withdrawn on 16th December, 2011 by moving another application but under which provision of law, is not disclosed. Trial court vide common impugned order of 7th January, 2012 has permitted the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the applications under Section 321 of Cr.P.C.. The aforesaid order was challenged by way of three separate revision petitions by petitioner which stand dismissed vide common impugned order of 15th November, 2014.

3. Since the subject matter of these three petitions is identical and the grounds on which quashing of the common impugned order is sought, are also on the same lines, therefore, these three petitions were heard together and by this common judgment, they are being disposed of.

4. The question which came up for consideration before the revisional court was whether Public Prosecutor had acted independently while filing application under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. and the subsequent application seeking withdrawal of the earlier application under Section 321 of Cr.P.C..

5. The learned Revisional Court in the impugned order has relied upon a decision of 14th June, 2012 of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 3470/2012 Vipul Gupta Vs. State & ors. wherein the challenge to the legality of order of 15th December, 2011 of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi , agreeing with the proposal of Director of Prosecution not to press application for withdrawal of the case against the petitioner was considered and repelled. However, it was made clear in the aforesaid order that the right of independent consideration as to the legality of the withdrawal of the application was left open by observing as under:-

“31. It is not disputed by the petitioners that, in the meantime, the learned M.M. has permitted the withdrawal of the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. vide order dated 07.01.2012. It is not disputed by the petitioners that they opposed the withdrawal of the said applications under Section 321 Cr. P.C. and that they were heard by the Leaned M.M. on the said applications. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners have already preferred the remedy available to them in respect of the orders passed by the Ld. M.M., permitting the withdrawal of the applications under Section 321 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the petitioners have not only had the occasion to raise all the issues raised before this court, before the Ld. M.M., but still have the right to pursue the matter further and to raise all the issues available to them in appropriate proceedings.”

6. At the hearing, learned senior counsel for petitioner assailed the impugned orders on the ground that there is no provision under which application under Section 321 of the Cr.P.C. can be withdrawn. To submit so, reliance was placed upon Apex Court’s decisions in Patel Narshi Thakershi & ors. Vs. Pradyuman Singh ji Arjun Singh ji AIR 1970 SC 1273; R.R. Verma & ors. Vs. Union of India & ors. (1980) 3 SCC 402 & Subhash Chander Vs. State (Chandigarh Administration) & ors. AIR 1980 SC 423, wherein it has been declared that when quasi judicial power is exercised, then power of review must be conferred by a statute either specifically or by necessary implication.

7. It was vehemently submitted that without any change of circumstances, application for withdrawal from prosecution was extraneously withdrawn by the public prosecutor and the courts below have erred in permitting withdrawal of the application without any application of mind. I