The main legal point established in the judgment is that the right to sue accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff, and limitation commences to obtain a decree for declaration when the right to sue first accrues.

PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.

1. Way back in 1930, in the decision reported as AIR 1930 PC 270 Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan, Sir Binod Mitter, speaking for the Council, with reference to Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provision correspondence to Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stated as under: -

“There can be no “right to sue” until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.”

2. The view was cited with approval the next year in the decision reported as AIR 1931 PC 89 Gobinda Narayan v. Sham Lal. It was held that the expression ‘right to sue’ means the right to bring the particular suit with reference to which the plea of limitation is raised and that the starting point for limitation is when the rights are invaded.

3. The aforesaid views were summed up by the Supreme Court in the decision reported as AIR 1960 SC 335 Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan in the following words: -

“The legal position may be briefly stated thus: the right to sue under Art.120 of the Lim. Act accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe, the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that threat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right.”

4. Aforesaid three decisions were noted with approval by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported as AIR 1985 Delhi 358 Shah Construction Company Ltd., Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

5. With the aforesaid understanding of the law we note the pleadings of the appellant in paragraph 6 of the plaint filed by him regarding the accrual of the cause of action. It reads as under:-

“6. That the cause of action firstly arose on 1996-97 when the suit property was purchased by the Plaintiff benami in the name of his wife i.e. Defendant No.1 and the payment in respect of the same was paid by the Plaintiff from his various accounts. It again arose when in lieu of the sale consideration, registered General Power of Attorney, Special Power of Attorney and Will was executed in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of the suit property. It again arose on various occasions when the complaints were made against the Defendant No.1. It again arose on 03.08.2010 when the Plaintiff came to know that the Defendant No.1 had got executed and registered a Sale Deed dated 30.03.2010 in her favour from defendant No.2 to 4 in respect of said property. It again arose on 12.09.2010 when the Plaintiff came to know that the Defendant No.1 is in the process of illegally and unlawfully disposing of the suit property of which otherwise the Plaintiff is the owner. The cause of action is still subsisting and continuing as the above threats are still continuing and subsisting.”

6. The case of the appellant is that the first respondent (impleaded as defendant No.1 in the suit) is his wife and when the chemistry between the two was not fouled by the economics, he paid Rs.22,25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Two Lacs and Twenty Five Thousand only) to Manoj Mehra, Madhu Mehra and Manish Arora (impleaded as defendants No.2 to 4 in the suit) for purchase of property bearing No.27, 2nd Floor, Mandakini NRI Complex, Greater Kailash Part IV, New Delhi as full and final sale consideration and got executed an agreement to sell dated January 16, 1996 in favour of his wife i.e. defendants 2 to 4, as sellers, agreed to sell the property in question to his wife as the purchaser. On March 27, 1997 a general power of attorney was executed by defendants No.2 to 4 in his favour authorizing him to deal with the property. He pleaded that relations between him and his wife soured and the two