The central legal point established in the judgment is that the limitation period for filing a defamation suit commences from the date of publication of the libellous material, and the suit must be filed within the prescribed period.

1. Allowed subject to just exceptions. RFA 867/2015

2. This is an appeal filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 24.09.2015. The trial court has, by virtue of the impugned judgment and order, allowed the respondent/defendant’s application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the CPC).

2.1 The short ground on which the trial court has allowed the aforementioned application is that the limitation period prescribed under Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the 1963 Act) had expired.

2.2 To be noted, the appellant / plaintiff had filed a suit for defamation against the respondent/ defendant. The suit for defamation was based on the respondent / defendant’s letters dated 08.06.2013 and 12.07.2013 addressed to the one, Mr. Vinay Kaushik, who was appointed, at the relevant point in time, as the Returning Officer. According to the appellant / plaintiff, the assertions made in the said letters were defamatory.

2.3 The suit in this case, based on the contents of the aforementioned letters of the respondent/ defendant, was instituted on 05.03.2015.

2.4 It is not disputed before me by the learned counsel for the appellant / plaintiff, as it cannot be, that the period of limitation prescribed under Article 75 of the 1963 Act is one year from the date when the libellous material is published. Having said that the appellant / plaintiff had, however, taken the stand that the limitation would commence only when letters dated 08.06.2013 and 12.07.2013 were finally ruled upon by the concerned statutory authority.

2.5 It is not disputed before me by the appellant / plaintiff, who appears in person, and incidentally, is also a lawyer by profession, that the aforementioned letters of the respondent/defendant, which were addressed to the Returning officer objected to his membership to the concerned society.

2.6 It is also not disputed before me, by the appellant/plaintiff, that the Administrator dealt with the said letters of the respondent/defendant in his order dated 30.09.2013 / 01.10.2013. After consideration of the contents of the respondent/defendant’s letters, the Administrator came to the conclusion that the objections raised by the respondent/defendant could not sustain against the appellant / plaintiff.

2.7 The trial court after taking into account this aspect ruled that willy-nilly even if the appellant’s / plaintiff’s stand is taken into account, limitation qua the suit would have expired in October 2014 and therefore, the institution of the suit on 05.03.2015 was beyond time. In other words, according to the trial court, limitation in, the very least, would commence from the date of order of the Registrar i.e. order dated 30.09.2013/01.10.2013.

3. Before me, the appellant / plaintiff raises the same plea and in pursuance thereof, adds, that since, the respondent / defendant had the opportunity to assail the order of the Registrar, limitation could not have commenced with effect from 01.10.2013.

3.1 I am unable to persuade myself to accept this submission. If this submission is taken into account then, till such time the respondent/ defendant takes recourse to a possible remedy available to him in law, by seeking access to the last court, limitation, would not commence in the matter.

4. In the given facts, limitation qua the action filed by the appellant / plaintiff expired surely in October 2014, if not earlier. The suit as, indicated above, was filed on 05.03.2015. Consequently, the suit being beyond limitation, was rightly dismissed by the trial court by allowing the respondent/ defendant’s application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC.

5. In my view, no interference is called for qua the impugned judgment. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed.