Ranjana Prakash Desai, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against judgment and order dated 07/01/2011 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Misc. Case No.427 of 2009 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant holding that an appeal filed by the State against an order of acquittal shall lie to the Sessions Court under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Code") and not under Section 378(4) of the Code to the High Court.

3. The appellant is the supplier-cum-manufacturer of the food article namely Sweetened Carbona ted Water. He is carrying on business in the name and style of M/s. Subhash Soda Water Factory. On 6/6/1989 at about 4.15 p.m., one P.N. Khatri, Food Inspector, purchased a sample of sweetened carbonated water for analysis from one Daya Chand Jain, Ven-dor-cum-Contractor of Canteen at Suraj Cinema, Dhansa Road, Najafgarh, Delhi. After following the necessary procedure, the sample was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis. On analysis, the Public Analyst opined that the sample does not conform to the prescribed standard. After conclusion of the investigation, the respondent-State through its Local Health Authority - P.K. Jaiswal filed a Complaint bearing No.64 of 1991 against the appellant and Daya Chand in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi alleging that the appellant and the said Daya Chand had violated the provisions of Sections 2(ia), (a), (b), (f), (h), (1), (m), Section 2(ix) (j), (k) and Section 24 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, TFA Act") and Rule 32, Rule 42 (zzz)(i) and Rule 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (for short, "the Rules") and committed an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(1A) read with Section 7 of the PEA Act and the Rules. Since Daya Chand died during the pendency of the case, the case abated as against him. The appellant was tried and acquitted by learned Magistrate by order dated 27/2/2007.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 27/2/2007, the respondent-State preferred Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 2008 in the Sessions Court under Section 378(1)(a) of the Code. The appellant raised a preliminary objection in regard to the maintainability of the said Appeal before the Sessions Court in view of Section 378(4) of the Code. He contended that an appeal arising from an order of acquittal in a complaint case shall lie to the High Court. The said objection was rejected by the Sessions Court by order dated 4/2/2009.

5. Aggrieved by the said order dated 4/2/2009, the appellant preferred Criminal Misc. Case No.427 of 2009 before the High Court. By order dated 9/7/2009, the High Court held that the Sessions Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed in a complaint case and directed that the appeal be transferred to it. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 2008 pending before the Sessions Court was transferred to the High Court and re-numbered as Criminal Appeal No.642 of 2009.

6. The respondent-State carried the said order dated 9/7/2009 to this court by Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9880 of 2009 (Criminal Appeal No.1514 of 2010). By order dated 13/8/2010, this court remanded the matter to the High Court and directed that the matter be decided afresh after taking into consideration Sections 378(1) and 378(4) of the Code and the relevant provisions of the PFA. On remand, the High Court passed the impugned judgment and order dated 7/1/2011.

7. The short point which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether in a complaint case, an appeal from an order of acquittal of the Magistrate would lie to the Sessions Court under Section 378(1) (a) of the Code or to the High Court under Section 378(4) of the Code.

8. At our request, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General has assisted us as Amicus Curiae. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Lekhi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. P.P. Malhotr