Suresh Kait, J.

Crl. M.A. No. 5116/2007(exemption)

Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

Application stands disposed of.

CRL.M.C.No.1474/2007 & Crl.M.A.5115/2007

1. The instant petition is being filed while challenging the complaint filed by the MCD under Section 347/461 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred as ''the said Act'') against the petitioner.

2. Mr. Rajat Aneja, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that allegations in the complaint against the petitioner are as under:-

That according to the Prosecution Report of Sh.Hasruddin Khan, Jr. Engineer (Bldg), West Zone, dated 09.09.2004, the accused Dr. D.V. Chug, Owner/Occupier of the property No. H.14, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi, was found committing the following offence on 09.09.2004 at 11:00AM under Section 347 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter called the Act), which is punishable under Section 461 of the DMC Act. That Dr. D.V.Chug, Owner/Occupier of the Property No.H.14, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi, has changed the use of the property from residential to commercial by running clinic of Dr. D. V. Chug, without written permission of the Commissioner, MCD. The sanctioned/permissible use of this property is residential only.

3. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the notice issued by the respondent No.2, which is at page No.23 wherein it is stated that the petitioner committed the offence under Section 347 DMC Act by changing the use of property from residential to commercial by running a clinic of doctor; whereas the MCD sanctioned the permissible use of this property as residential.

4. Undisputedly, the petitioner is a doctor, who was running his clinic from his own residence. Allegations in the complaint against him are that he was using his residential premises for the commercial activity.

5. The issue arise in the instant petition, whether, running of clinic from the residential premises, would come in commercial activity.

6. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is now 80 years of age as on date and the said clinic was closed down ten years back. Therefore, no purpose would be served by allowing the proceedings against the petitioner.

7. Learned counsel has relied upon Dr.Devendra M. Surti v. The State of Gujarat : AIR 1969 SC 63 wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:-

“6. Under s. 2(8) of the Act an 'establishment' is defined as meaning 'a shop, commercial establishment, residential hotel, restaurant, eating house, theatre, or other place of public amusement or entertainment to which this Act applies'. Section 2(24) again defines a "Residential hotel", s. 2(25) a "Restaurant or eating house" and s. 2(27) similarly defines a "Shop". Section 2(29) defines a "Theatre". It is clear therefore that the legislature has taken care separately to define each one of the categories of 'the establishments mentioned in s. 2(8) of the Act. It is, true that s. 2(4) of the Act has used words of very wide import and grammatically it may include even a consulting room where a doctor examines his patients with the help of a solitary nurse or attendant. But, in our opinion, in the matter of construing the language of s. 2(4) of the Act we must adopt the principle of noscitur a sociis. This rule, means that, when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled to-ether they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. The words take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a, sense analogous to, a less general. "Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broiderthan the maximum Ejusdein Generis." (Words and Phrases. Vol. XIV, p. 207). For instance, in Reed v. Ingham(1) it was upon the principle of the maxim nosscitur a soci