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2012 Supreme(Del) 3197
DELHI HIGH COURT
Sudershan Kumar Misra, J.
Mohan Banerjee - Appellant
Versus
State of Delhi & Ors. - Resopndent
RFA 311/2011
Decided On : 07-12-2012
For the Appellant :Mr. Asit Kumar Roy, Advocate
For the Respondent:Mr. Sachin Chopra, Advocate
The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of Article 74 of the Limitation Act to a suit for compensation for malicious prosecution, and the rejection of the argument that the suit should be treated as one for damages with a longer limitation period.
Headnote:
Limitation - Malicious Prosecution - Article 74 of the Limitation Act - The court discussed the application of Article 74 of the Limitation Act in a suit for compensation for malicious prosecution and the contention that the suit should be treated as one for damages, which would be covered under a different provision with a longer limitation period. The court rejected the appellant's argument and held that the suit was indeed covered under Article 74, and as such, it was barred by limitation.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, an old man aged above 90 years, filed a civil suit seeking compensation for harassment, mental agony, and other losses due to false implication in a criminal case. The suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation as it was considered to be covered under Article 74 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a one-year limitation period for suits for malicious prosecution.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the appellant's suit for compensation was indeed covered under Article 74 of the Limitation Act and was therefore barred by limitation. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the suit should be treated as one for damages with a longer limitation period.
Issues: The issues involved in the case included the nature of the appellant's suit - whether it was for malicious prosecution or for damages, and the applicable limitation period for the suit.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the appellant's suit for compensation was indeed covered under Article 74 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a one-year limitation period for suits for malicious prosecution. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the suit should be treated as one for damages with a longer limitation period.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision that the appellant's suit for compensation was barred by limitation under Article 74 of the Limitation Act.
Sudershan Kumar Misra, J.
RFA No. 311/2011
1. This Regular First Appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 24.12.2010 passed by Shri L.K. Gaur, Additional District Judge, New Delhi in Suit No. 384/2010 wherein the suit of the appellant was dismissed on the ground of limitation.
2. The appellant had been facing trial since 1990 on the allegation that he used to give false sureties by impersonation on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. The charge had been framed against the appellant, along with other accused persons, by a common order dated 6.5.2005. On 4.10.2008, the appellant/plaintiff was acquitted.
3. On 22.12.2009, the appellant sent a legal notice to the State through Lt. Governor for compensation, to which he did not receive any reply. Thereafter, the appellant/plaintiff preferred a Writ Petition No. 1810/2010 before this Court against the State seeking compensation, which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a suit in the appropriate Court.
4. The appellant then filed a civil suit for compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- for causing harassment, mental agony, economical and physical losses, loss of reputation etc. due to false implication in a criminal case.
5. In that matter, the learned court below concluded that compensation was claimed by the appellant in the suit on the basis of malicious prosecution; for which the period of limitation prescribed is one year under Article 74 of the Limitation Act, to be counted from the date of acquittal from prosecution. It has held that, even after excluding the period when the writ petition was pending before this Court between 10.3.2010 & 23.04.2010; as well as the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the judgment of the trial court acquitting him, the suit is still barred by limitation.
6. Aggrieved of this order dismissing his suit on the ground of limitation, the appellant has appealed to this Court.
7. Counsel for the appellant states that the appellant is an old man aged above 90 years of age. He has been harassed by the defendants/respondents for more than 19 years by falsely implicating him in a criminal case and making him face many hearings and accusations from which he has been honourably and completely acquitted.
8. He further states that the trial court fell into an error in dismissing his suit on the ground of limitation considering it to be covered under Article 74 of the Limitation Act, being a suit for malicious prosecution.
9. It is the case of the appellant that his suit is not one for malicious prosecution; and that he is only seeking damages for the mental agony and defamation, loss of reputation etc. that he has suffered for so many years at the hands of the respondents. He states that his case cannot be considered under Article 74 of the Limitation Act at all and is covered under some other provision of law.
10. The suit of the plaintiff was thrown out on a preliminary objection with regard to limitation, holding that the appellant had preferred a suit for compensation for malicious prosecution which was covered by Article 74 of the Limitation Act and the time available to institute such a suit was one year from the date of the accrual of cause of action, which had long expired.
11. Even counsel for the appellant concedes that if Article 74 were to apply, the suit is beyond limitation. Therefore, the only question that remains is under what provision the case of the appellant is covered. His case appears to be that this is not a case for compensation for malicious prosecution; and that it is simply a claim for damages. It is, however, obvious that the basis of that claim for damages appears to be malicious prosecution. In fact, counsel for the appellant is unable to demonstrate any other basis for the suit brought by his client.
12. In this case, the time began to run w.e.f. 4.10.2008, when the appellant was acquitted of the charge leveled against him. It expired on 3.10.2009, i.e. after a period of one year in te
